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A Ghost in the House of Justice:
Death and the Language of the Law
Shoshana Felman*
INTRODUCTION
A witness faints on the stand during the Eichmann trial. This Essay will
explore the meaning of this unexpected legal moment, and will ask: Is the
witness's collapse relevant-and if so, in what sense-to the legal
framework of the trial? How does this courtroom event affect the trial's
definition of legal meaning in the wake of the Holocaust? Under what
circumstances and in what ways can the legal default of a witness
constitute a legal testimony in its own right?
I will present, first, Hannah Arendt's reading of this episode, and will
later contrast her reading with my own interpretation of this courtroom
scene. Still later, I will analyze the judges' reference to this scene.
These different and successive analytical and textual vantage points will
be systematically and commonly subordinated to the following three
overriding theoretical inquiries:
1) What is the role of human fallibility in trials?
2) Can moments of disruption of convention and of discourse-moments
of unpredictability that take the legal institution by surprise-nevertheless
contribute to the formulation of a legal meaning?
3) How can such moments shed light on (what I set out to highlight as) the
key structural relation between law and trauma? What tools does the law
have-and what are the law's limits-in adjudicating massive death and
in articulating legal meaning out of massive trauma?
* Copyright © 2001 by Shoshana Felman, Thomas E. Donnelley Professor of French and
Comparative Literature, Yale University. This material may not be reprinted, reproduced,
photocopied, quoted or cited, in whole or in part, without express permission of the author. All rights
reserved.
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PART ONE: DEATH AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW
Two Visions of Historic Trial
In the postwar trials that attempted to judge history and to resolve the
horrors of administrative massacre in the wake of the unprecedented
trauma of the Second World War, two antithetical legal visions of historic
trial have emerged: that of the Nuremberg trials in 1945, and that of the
Eichmann trial in 1961. The difference between these two paradigms of
historic trial derived from their divergent evidentiary approach: The
Nuremberg prosecution made a decision to shun witnesses and base the
case against the Nazi leaders exclusively on documents, whereas the
prosecution in the Eichmann trial chose to rely extensively on witnesses as
well as documents to substantiate its case. While both prosecutors
similarly used the trial to establish what in Nietzsche's term can be called
a "monumental [legal] history,"' Nuremberg was a monumental
documentary case, whereas the Eichmann trial was a monumental
testimonial case (despite its equally substantial use of documents). In
1954, the chief prosecutor and the architect of the Nuremberg trials,
Justice Robert Jackson, retrospectively explained the grounds for his
choice of proof:
The prosecution early was confronted with two vital decisions...
One was whether chiefly to rely upon living witnesses or upon
documents for proof of the case. The decision.., was to use and rest
on documentary evidence to prove every point possible. The
argument against this was that documents are dull, the press would
not report them, the trial would become wearisome and would not get
across to the people. There was much truth in this position, I must
admit. But it seemed to me that witnesses, many of them persecuted
and hostile to the Nazis, would always be chargeable with bias, faulty
recollection, and even perjury. The documents could not be accused
of partiality, forgetfulness, or invention, and would make the sounder
foundation, not only for the immediate guidance of the tribunal, but
for the ultimate verdict of history. The result was that the tribunal
declared, in its judgement, "The case, therefore, against the
defendants rests in a large measure on documents of their own
making."2
1. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY FOR LIFE 12-17 (Adrian Collins
trans., The Liberal Arts Press 1957) (1949).
2. Robert Jackson, Introduction to WHITNEY HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE EVIDENCE AT
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The documentary approach matched the bureaucracy of the Nazi regime
and was particularly suitable to the exposure of the monstrous
bureaucratic nature of the crime and of its alibis. The testimonial approach
was necessary for the full disclosure of the thought-defying magnitude of
the offense against the victims, and was particularly suitable to the
valorization of the victims' narrative perspective.
The reason he decided to add living witnesses to documents, the Israeli
prosecutor Gideon Hausner explained, was that the Nuremberg trials had
failed to transmit,3 or to impress on human memory and "on the hearts of
men" the knowledge and the shock of what had happened. The Eichmann
trial sought, in contrast, not only to establish facts but to transmit (transmit
truth as event and as the shock of an encounter with events, transmit
history as an experience). The tool of law was used not only as a tool of
proof of unimaginable facts, but, above all, as a compelling medium of
transmission-as an effective tool of national and international
communication of these thought-defying facts. In comparing thus the
evidentiary approach of Nuremberg to his own legal choices, the Israeli
prosecutor wrote:
There is an obvious advantage in written proof; whatever it has
to convey is there in black and white.... Nor can a document be...
broken down in cross-examination. It speaks in a steady voice; it may
not cry out, but neither can it be silenced.
This was the course adopted at the Nuremberg trials .... It
was... efficient.... But it was also one of the reasons why the
proceedings there failed to reach the hearts of men.
In order merely to secure a conviction, it was obviously enough
to let the archives speak.... But I knew we needed more than a
conviction; we needed a living record of a gigantic human and
national disaster.
NUREMBERG, at xxix, xxxv-xxxvi (1954).
3. "Novelist Rebecca West, covering the first 'historic' Nuremberg trial for the New Yorker,
found it insufferably tedious," writes MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND
THE LAW 91 (2000) (referring to Rebecca West, Extraordinary Exile, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 1946, at
34). "This reaction was not uncommon," Osiel continues:
As one reporter notes: "It was the largest crime in history and it promised the greatest courtroom
spectacle. [But] ... [w]hat ensued was an excruciatingly long and complex trial that failed to
mesmerize a distracted world. Its mass of evidence created boredom, mixed occasionally with
an abject horror before which ordinary justice seemed helpless."
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In any criminal proceedings the proof of guilt and the imposition
of a penalty, though all-important, are not the exclusive objects.
Every trial also.., tells a story .... Our perceptions and our senses
are geared to limited experiences .... We stop perceiving living
creatures behind the mounting totals of victims; they turn into
incomprehensible statistics.
It was beyond human powers to present the calamity in a way
that would do justice to six million tragedies. The only way to
concretize it was to call surviving witnesses, as many as the
framework of the trial would allow, and to ask each of them to tell a
tiny fragment of what he had seen and experienced.... Put together,
the various narratives of different people would be concrete enough
to be apprehended. In this way I hoped to superimpose on a phantom
a dimension of reality.4
Because of the differences in their evidentiary approach, the Nuremberg
trials made a more solid contribution to international law, in setting up a
binding legal precedent of crimes against humanity; the Eichmann trial
made a greater impact on collective memory. The two trials dramatize the
difference between human and non-human evidence. Jackson desires to
exclude human vulnerability both from the process of the law and from
the exercise of judgment. He thus protects the courtroom from the death it
talks about. Because Jackson wants his legal evidence to be literally
invulnerable, he has to give preference to non-human and non-living
evidence. "The documents could not be accused of partiality,
forgetfulness, or invention." "[W]itnesses," on the other hand, "many of
them persecuted," "would always be chargeable with bias, faulty
recollection, and even perjury."5
In choosing, on the contrary, to include as evidence the previously
excluded, fragile testimony of the persecuted, the Eichmann trial quite
specifically gives legal space to the potential legal failings and
shortcomings Jackson fears. It consciously embraces the vulnerability, the
legal fallibility and the fragility of the human witness. Paradoxically, it is
precisely the witness's fragility that is called upon to testify and to bear
witness. 6
4. GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 291-92 (1968).
5. Jackson, supra note 2, at xxxv-xxxvi.
6. In a short text called The Witness, Borges writes:
Deeds which populate the dimensions of space and which reach their end when someone dies
may cause us wonderment, but one thing, or an infinite number of things, dies in every final
agony, unless there is a universal memory.... What will die with me when I die, what pathetic
and fragile form will the world lose?
JORGE LUIS BORGES, The Witness, in LABYRINTHS: SELECTED STORIES AND OTHER WRITINGS 243,
[Vol. 13:241
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An Oath to the Dead (A Pseudonym)
Nowhere was this fragile essence of the human testimony more
dramatically exemplified and more acutely tested than when, in one of the
most breathtaking moments of the trial, a witness fainted on the stand.
He was called to testify because he was a crucially relevant eyewitness:
He met Eichmann in Auschwitz.' But he collapsed before he could narrate
this factual encounter. His testimony thus amounted to a legal failure, the
kind of legal failure Jackson feared. And yet this legal moment of surprise,
captured on videotape,8 has left an indelible mark on the trial and has
impressed itself on visual and historic memory. This courtroom scene has
since been broadcast many times on radio and television. Despite the
repetition, the power of this legally compelling moment does not wane
and its force of astonishment does not diminish and does not fade. It has
remained a literally unforgettable key-moment of the trial, a signal or a
symbol of a constantly replayed and yet ungrasped, ungraspable kernel of
collective memory.9 I propose to try to probe here the significance of this
mysteriously material kernel.
Who was this witness? He happened to be a writer. He was known
under the pseudonym Ka-Tzetnik [K-Zetnik].1" He saw himself as a
messenger of the dead, a bearer of historical meaning he had the duty to
preserve and to transmit. K-Zetnik is a slang word meaning a
concentration camp inmate, one identified not by name but by the number
the Nazis tattooed on each inmate's arm. "I must carry this name," K-
Zetnik testified during the Eichmann trial, "as long as the world will not
243 (1962).
It is because humans, unlike documents, do not endure that the Eichmann trial calls upon each
witness to narrate the singular story that will die when he or she dies. Transience is inscribed within
this legal process as the witness's death is, from the start, implicitly inscribed within each testimony.
While documents-unlike the living witnesses--exclude death as a possibility inherent in the
evidence, and while the Nuremberg trials claim authority precisely in the act of sheltering the
courtroom from the death it talks about, in the Eichmann trial, on the contrary, "death is the sanction
of everything the storyteller has to tell. He has borrowed his authority from death." WALTER
BENJAMIN, The Storyteller, in ILLUMINATIONS: ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS 83, 94 (Hannah Arendt
ed., 1968).
7. Attested to by the chief prosecutor's widow in THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN, a PBS
documentary home video (B3470) (co-produced by ABC News Productions and Great Projects Film
Company 1997).
8. The Eichmann trial was the first trial televised in its entirety. The complete trial footage is kept
in the archives of the State of Israel.
9. "Our memory," writes Valdry, "repeats to us the discourse that we have not understood.
Repetition is responding to incomprehension. It signifies to us that the act of language has not been
accomplished." PAUL VALERY, Commentaires de Charmes, in I OEUVRES 1507, 1510 (1957) (author's
translation).
10. The writer published the English translation of his works under the pseudonym Ka-Tzetnik
135633. An alternative orthography of the author's name, the one used in the trial's English transcripts
and in HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM (1964), is K-Zetnik (since the name is modeled
on the German letters K.Z., pronounced Ka-tzet, from Konzentrationslager, "concentration camp").
This latter orthography is the one I will hereafter use.
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awaken after the crucifying of the nation.., as humanity has risen after
the crucifixion of one man."'1 K-Zetnik had published, prior to the
Eichmann trial, several books that were translated into many languages
and that had gained celebrity on both sides of the Atlantic. Describing
human existence in extermination camps, they were all published as the
successive volumes of what the author calls "the Chronicle of a Jewish
Family in the Twentieth Century." The name K-Zetnik was selected
almost automatically. The author began writing soon after he was liberated
from Auschwitz, in a British army hospital in Italy. He had asked the
Israeli soldier who was taking care of him to bring him pen and paper: He
had made an oath to the dead, he said, to be their voice and to chronicle
their story; since he felt his days were numbered, he had to hurry up; his
writing was from the beginning racing against death. For two and a half
weeks he hardly got up, writing in one fit his first book. He asked the
soldier who was taking care of him to transfer the finished manuscript to
Israel. Reading the title "Salamandra" on the first page, the soldier
whispered: "You forgot to write the name of the author." "The name of
the author?" the surviving writer cried out in reply: "They who went to the
crematories wrote this book; write their name: Ka-Tzetnik."' 2 Thus the




"What is your full name?" asked the presiding judge. 13
"Yehiel Dinoor," 14 answered the witness. The prosecutor then
11. Criminal Case 40/61 (Jerusalem), Attorney General v. Eichmann (1961). English translation
of the trial transcripts in 3 THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF JERUALEM, Session No. 68 (June 7, 1961), Jerusalem 1963, at 1237 [hereinafter 3
PROCEEDINGS]. I use here the modified English version quoted in ARENDT, supra note 10, at 224.
12. K-ZETNIK, TZOFAN: EDMA 32 (Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House Ltd. 1987),
translated in KA-TZETNIK 135633, SHIVITTI: A VISION 16 (Eliyah Nike De-Nur & Lisa Hermann
trans., Harper & Row 1989).
13. The narrative that follows is a literal transcription of the trial footage (session of K-Zetnik's
testimony), as seen in THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN, supra note 7. See also 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 11, at 1237.
14. Yehiel Dinoor was forty-five years old at the time of the trial. Born in Poland as Yehiel
Feiner, he changed his legal name to the Hebrew name Dinoor, meaning "a residue from the fire."
TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION: THE ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST 4 (Haim Watzman trans.,
Hill and Wang 1993) (1991). The name Dinoor is spelled alternatively as Dinur (in the trial's English
transcripts, see 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 11, at 1237, as De-nur (in the English translation of K-
ZETNIK, SHIVIrrl, supra note 12, and consequently, in the English version of SEGEV, THE SEVENTH
MILLION, supra), or as Dinoor (in ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM, supra note 10). I am following
Arendt's orthography because it best corresponds to the Hebrew pronunciation of the name.
[Vol. 13:241
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"What is the reason that you took the pen name K-Zetnik, Mr.
Dinoor?"
"It is not a pen name," the witness (now seated) began answering. "I
do not regard myself as a writer who writes literature. This is a
chronicle from the planet of Auschwitz. I was there for about two
years. Time there was different from what it is here on earth. Every
split second ran on a different cycle of time. And the inhabitants of
that planet had no names. They had neither parents nor children.
They did not dress as we dress here. They were not born there nor did
anyone give birth. Even their breathing was regulated by the laws of
another nature. They did not live, nor did they die, in accordance with
the laws of this world. Their names were the numbers, "K-Zetnik so
and so .... ." They left me, they kept leaving me, left ... for close to
two years they left me and always left me behind ... I see them,
they are watching me, I see them-"
At this point, the prosecutor gently interrupted: "Mr. Dinoor, could I
perhaps put a few questions to you if you will consent?"
But Dinoor continued speaking in a hollow and tense voice, oblivious
to the courtroom setting, as a man plunged in hallucination or in a
hypnotic trance. "I see them .... I saw them standing in the line.
Thereupon the presiding judge matter-of-factly intervened: "Mr.
Dinoor, please, please listen to Mr. Hausner; wait a minute, now you
listen to me!"
The haggard witness vacantly got up and without a warning collapsed
into a faint, slumping to the floor beside the witness stand.
Policemen ran toward Dinoor to lift his collapsed body, to support
him and to carry him out of the courtroom. 5 The flabbergasted
audience remained motionless, staring in disbelief. "Quiet, quiet,
quiet!" ordered the presiding judge: "I am asking for silence." A
woman's cry was heard from the direction of the audience. A woman
wearing sunglasses was coming from the audience toward the
unconscious human body held by the policemen, saying she was the
witness's wife. "You may approach," the bench conceded. "I do not
believe that we can go on." The witness was still limp and lifeless,
15. "All Israel held its breath," Tom Segev will remember thirty years later. "It was the most
dramatic moment of the trial, one of the most dramatic moments in the country's history." SEGEV,
supra note 14, at 4.
2001]
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plunged in a deep coma. "We shall take a recess now," declared the
presiding judge. "Beth Hamishpat"-["the House of Justice"]-
shouted the usher, as the audience rose to its feet and the three judges
in their black robes were going out. An ambulance was called and
rushed the witness to the hospital, where he spent two weeks between
life and death in a paralytic stroke. In time, he would recover.'6
The Legal v. The Poetical
The poet Haim Gouri who covered the trial wrote:
What happened here was the inevitable. [K-Zetnik's] desperate
attempt to transgress the legal channel and to return to the planet of
the ashes in order to bring it to us was too terrifying an experience for
him. He broke down.
Others spoke here for days and days, and told us each his story
from the bottom up ... He tried to depart from the quintessential
generalization, tried to define, like a meteor, the essence of that
world. He tried to find the shortest way between the two planets
among which his life had passed.
Or maybe he caught a glimpse of Eichmann all of a sudden and
his soul was short-circuited into darkness, all the lights going out.
In a way he had said everything. Whatever he was going to say
later was, it turns out, superfluous detail. 17
This empathetic description which took the testimony on its terms and
which, examining it from the vantage point of its own metaphors,
poetically reflected back the shock and the emotion of the audience, was a
poet's coverage of a fellow poet's testimony. The legal coverage of this
episode that Hannah Arendt sent to The New Yorker and later published in
her famous Eichmann in Jerusalem was much harsher and much less
forgiving.
Arendt disputed fundamentally the way in which the prosecution framed
the trial by narratively focusing it on the victims. The state sought to
narrate a unique legal story that had never before been told and that had
16. Author's transcription of archival footage as seen in TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN, supra note
7; see also 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 11, at 1237.
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failed to be articulated by the Nuremberg trials. To do so, it sought to
reconstruct the facts of the Nazi war against the Jews from the victims'
point of view and to establish, for the first time in legal history, a
"monumental history" not of the victors but of the victims. But Arendt
argued that the trial should be focused on the criminal, not on the victim;
she wanted it to be a cosmopolitan trial, rather than a Jewish nationalist
one; she wanted it to tell the story of totalitarianism and of totalitarian
crimes against humanity, rather than the story of the Jewish tragedy and of
the crime against the Jewish people. She thus felt impelled to fight Jewish
self-centeredness on every point (and on every legal point), and
systematically to deconstruct and to decenter the prosecution's
monumentalizing victim narrative. In her role as legal reporter for The
New Yorker, Arendt finds a stage for exercising her ironic talents not only
to dispute the story of the prosecution, but to narrate a contrapuntal legal
narrative and to become in turn an ironic or a contrapuntal prosecutor-a
prosecutor or (in Nietzsche's terms) a critical historian of the monumental
trial.18
When she was first confronted with the Nazi crimes during the
Nuremberg trials, Arendt believed the magnitude of the phenomenon and
the abyss it opened in perception could not be apprehended by the law,
except by rupturing its legal framework. She thus wrote in 1946 to Karl
Jaspers, her ex-teacher and the continued German friend and interlocutor
whom she refound at the end of the war, and through whose sole agency
she has now reconnected with her own disrupted German youth:
Your definition of Nazi policy as a crime ("criminal guilt"' 9) strikes
me as questionable. The Nazi crimes, it seems to me, explode the
limits of the law; and that is precisely what constitutes their
monstrousness. For these crimes, no punishment is severe enough...
• That is, this guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt, oversteps and
shatters any and all legal systems. That is the reason why the Nazis in
Nuremberg are so smug.... And just as inhuman as their guilt is the
innocence of the victims. Human beings simply can't be as innocent
as they all were in the face of the gas chambers (the most repulsive
usurer was as innocent as a newborn child because no crime deserves
such a punishment). We are simply not equipped to deal, on a human,
political level, with a guilt that is beyond crime and an innocence that
is beyond goodness or virtue. This is the abyss that opened up before
us as early as 1933 ... and into which we have finally stumbled. I
don't know how we will ever get out of it, for the Germans are
18. See NIETZSCHE, supra note 1. On the difference between the "monumental" and the "critical"
versions of the Eichmann trial, see Shoshana Felman, Theaters of Justice: Arendt in Jerusalem, the
Eichmann Trial and the Redefinition of Legal Meaning in the Wake of the Holocaust, 27 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 201 (2001).
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burdened now with... hundreds of thousands of people who cannot
be adequately punished within the legal system; and we Jews are
burdened with millions of innocents, by reason of which every Jew
alive today can see himself as innocence personified.2 °
Jaspers does not agree with Arendt. Her attitude, he says, is too poetical.
But poetry, he emphasizes, is a much more inadequate, a much less sober
tool of apprehension than the law. Poetry by definition is misguided
because, by its very nature, it is made to miss the banality of the
phenomenon. And the banality, in Jaspers' eyes, is the constitutive feature
of the Nazi horror, a feature that should not be mystified or mythified.
You say that what the Nazis did cannot be comprehended as
"crime"-I'm not altogether comfortable with your view, because a
guilt that goes beyond all criminal guilt inevitably takes on a streak
of "greatness"--of satanic greatness-which is, for me, as
inappropriate for the Nazis as all the talk about the "demonic"
element in Hitler .... It seems to me that we have to see these things
in their total banality, in their prosaic triviality, because that's what
truly characterizes them .... I regard any hint of myth and legend
with horror .... Your view is appealing-especially as contrasted
with what I see as the false inhuman innocence of the victims. But all
this would have to be expressed differently.... The way you express
it, you've almost taken the path of poetry. And a Shakespeare would
never be able to give adequate form to this material-his instinctive
aesthetic sense would lead to falsification of it .... There is no idea
and no essence here. Nazi crime is properly a subject for psychology
and sociology, for psychopathology and jurisprudence only.21
From its inception, the future concept of the "banality of evil" emerges
as a concept that defines itself by its methodological invalidation of the
"the path of poetry," against which it sets up the purposely reductive
terminology of "jurisprudence only" and the sobering path of the law (and
of the social sciences). "I found what you say about my thoughts on
'beyond crime and innocence' half convincing," Arendt replies at first
ambivalently, but she concedes: "We have to combat all impulses to
mythologize the horrible. '22
When the Eichmann trial is announced fifteen years later, Jaspers and
Arendt switch positions. Jaspers maintains that Israel should not try
Eichmann because Eichmann's guilt-the subject of the trial-is "larger
than law."2 3 Arendt insists that only law can deal with it: "We have no
20. Letter from Hannah Arendt to Karl Jaspers (Aug. 18, 1946), in CORRESPONDENCE: 1926-
1969, at 54 (Lotte Kohler & Hans Saner eds., Robert & Rita Kimber trans., 1992) (emphasis added).
21. Letter from Arendt to Jaspers (Oct. 19, 1946), in CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 20, at 62.
22. Letter from Arendt to Jaspers (Dec. 17, 1946), in CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 20, at 68.
23. Letter from Arendt to Jaspers (Dec. 16, 1960), in CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 20, at 413.
250 [Vol. 13:241
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tools to hand except legal ones," she says.24 By now, the tool of law is in
her hands, par excellence, a tool of apprehension of banality, a tool
specifically of demythologization and of deliberate sobering reduction.
And if the perpetrator must be banalized and demythologized to be
understood in its proper light, so must the victim. No longer can the
victim's innocence be allowed to burst the legal frame or to explode the
tool of law. No longer can the victim be spared the banality of innocence.
HI
Arendt's Contrapuntal Tale
Arendt reserves some of her harshest language and some of her fiercest
irony in Eichmann in Jerusalem for the description of K-Zetnik's
unsuccessful court appearance. Indeed, nowhere is Arendt's role as
contrapuntal, critical historian of the trial more clearly and more blatantly
expressed than in her narration of this episode. Arendt views K-Zetnik's
failure on the stand as symptomatic of the general misfire of the trial. She
blames this general misfire on the misdirections and the blunders of the
prosecution, whose witness has symbolically defaulted through its own
fault.
Generally, Arendt makes three objections to the prosecution's choice of
witnesses:
1) Contrary to legal rules of evidence, the witnesses are not selected for
their relevance to Eichmann's acts but for the purposes of the depiction of
a larger picture of the Nazi persecution of the Jews. "This case," writes
Arendt disapprovingly, "was built on what the Jews had suffered, not on
what Eichmann had done."25 This depiction by the victims of the
persecution they had suffered and their reconstruction of the global history
of their victimization is irrelevant in Arendt's eyes. K-Zetnik as a witness
seems to Arendt to exemplify the witnesses' irrelevance.
2) Contrary to Arendt's judgment and to her taste, the prosecution prefers
witnesses of prominence. It has a predilection, in particular, for famous
writers such as K-Zetnik and Abba Kovner. The former's testimony was a
fiasco. The latter, Arendt caustically notes, "had not so much testified as
addressed an audience with the ease of someone who is used to speaking
in public and resents interruptions from the floor., 26 In Arendt's eyes, a
witness' fame is a corrupting element of the judicial process. The writer's
24. Letter from Arendt to Jaspers (Dec. 23, 1960), in CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 20, at 417.
25. ARENDT, supra note 10, at 6.
26. Id. at 230.
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professional articulateness compromises the truth of the testimony in
turning testimonies into speeches. Such is K-Zetnik's case.
3) The prosecution's choice of witnesses is guided, Arendt charges, by
theatrical considerations. The witnesses are called for the sensational
effects provided by their "tales of horror."27 K-Zetnik's breakdown is an
accidental yet consistent illustration of this logic that transforms testimony
into a theatrical event that parasitizes the trial.
Arendt writes:
At no time is there anything theatrical in the conduct of the
judges.... [J]udge Landau... is doing his best, his very best to
prevent this trial from becoming a show trial under the influence of
the prosecutor's love of showmanship. Among the reasons he cannot
always succeed is the simple fact that the proceedings happen on a
stage before an audience, with the usher's marvelous shout at the
beginning of each session producing the effect of the rising curtain.
Whoever planned this auditorium.., had a theater in mind ....
[C]learly, this courtroom is not a bad place for the show trial David
Ben Gurion, Prime Minister of Israel, had in mind when he decided
to have Eichamnn kidnapped in Argentina and brought to the district
court of Jerusalem to stand trial for his role in "the final solution to
the Jewish question."
Yet no matter how consistently the judges shunned the limelight,
there they were, seated at the top of the raised platform, facing the
audience as from the stage in a play .... [T]he audience was
supposed to represent the whole world... [T]hey were to watch a
spectacle as sensational as the Nuremberg Trials, only this time "the
tragedy of Jewry as a whole was to be the central concern."
It was precisely the play aspect of the trial that collapsed under
the weight of the hair-raising atrocities.
Thus, the trial never became a play, but the show trial Ben
27. Id. at 223. Cf id. at 8 ("As witness followed witness and horror was piled upon horror, [the
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Gurion had had in mind... did take place.28
Most of the witnesses, Arendt narrates, were Israeli citizens who "had
been picked from hundreds and hundreds of applicants. '29 But Arendt is
suspicious of witnesses who volunteer. She is allergic to the narcissism
she keeps spying both in the legal actors (the chief prosecutor in
particular) and in the witnesses whom she suspects of seeking or being
complacent with the elements of spectacle that parasitize and compromise
the trial. K-Zetnik is for her a case in point. The narrative of his collapse
becomes, in Arendt's hands, not an emotional account of human
testimonial pathos but a didactic tale that illustrates ironically what
accidents can happen when a witness is, quite paradoxically, too eager to
appear. It is thus with her most sarcastic, her most undercutting, and most
funny style that Arendt will approach this testimony.
How much wiser it would have been to resist these pressures
altogether.., and to seek out those who had not volunteered! As
though to prove the point, the prosecution called upon a writer, well
known on both sides of the Atlantic under the name K-Zetnik ... as
the author of several books on Auschwitz which dealt with brothels,
homosexuals, and other "human interest stories." He started off, as he
had done at many of his public appearances, with an explanation of
his adopted name.... He continued with a little excursion into
astrology: the star "influencing our fate in the same way as the star of
ashes at Auschwitz is there facing our planet, radiating toward our
planet." And when he had arrived at "the unnatural power above
Nature" which had sustained him thus far, and now, for the first time,
paused to catch his breath, even Mr. Hausner felt that something had
to be done about this "testimony," and, very timidly, very politely,
interrupted: "Could I perhaps put a few questions to you if you will
consent?" Whereupon the presiding judge saw his chance as well:
"Mr. Dinoor, please, please listen to Mr. Hausner and to me." In
response, the disappointed witness, probably deeply wounded,
fainted and answered no more questions.3"
"[E]ven Mr. Hausner felt that something had to be done about this
'testimony."' For Arendt, this is a "testimony" only in quotation marks. It
is an aberration of a testimony. Arendt's derision is, however, not directed
personally at K-Zetnik but derives from an impersonal black-humorous
perception of the ludicrous, hilarious way in which the courtroom as a
whole could be mistaken, at this legally surprising moment, for a theater
of the absurd. The buffoonery comes from the situation, not from the
people. The farcical or comic element derives from the discrepancy and
28. Id. at 4-9.
29. Id. at 223.
30. Id. at 223-24.
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from the total incommensurability between the two dimensions that the
testimony inadvertently brings into dialogue: the natural and the
supernatural, the rationality and discipline of courtroom protocols and the
irruption of irrationality through a delirious rambling or what Arendt calls
an "astrological excursion" (the witness's voyage into "other planets"). 31 I
would argue differently than Arendt that the courtroom in its very legal
essence here flirts with madness and with nonsense. For some, this
courtroom drama and the suffering it unfolds both in the past and in the
present of the courtroom constitute a tragedy, a shock. For Arendt, this is a
comedy. Pain is translated into laughter. If this is theater, sometimes
potentially sublime or tragic, it is a Brechtian theater. Keeping her
distance is crucial for Arendt. The ludicrous example of K-Zetnik's
fainting and his default as a witness illustrates, for Arendt, not the
proximity uncannily revealed between madness and reason, not the
profound pathos of a cognitive abyss abruptly opened up inside the
courtroom and materialized in the unconscious body of the witness, but
the folly of the prosecution in both its disrespect for legal relevance and in
its narcissistic and misguided predilection for witnesses of prominence.
This double folly of the prosecution gets both its poetic justice and its
comic punishment when its own witness faints outside the witness stand
and inadvertently becomes an inert, hostile witness who "answers no more
questions. 32
Evidentiary Misunderstandings
Looking at the facts, Arendt's fierce irony ironically is based on two
erroneous assumptions:
1) Contrary to what Arendt presumes, Dinoor did not volunteer to share
his "tale of horror" on the witness stand but instead was an involuntary
and reluctant witness. As a writer, he had always shunned public
appearances as a matter of principle. Consequently, he had at first refused
to testify. The chief prosecutor pressured Dinoor to obtain his reluctant
consent to appear before the court.
2) Among the trial's testimonies, Arendt depicts K-Zetnik's as the
testimony that is self-evidently the most crazily remote from facts.33 She
31. Id.
32. Id. at 224.
33. Arendt refers to the common sense of the situation. But as Robert Ferguson notes, "common
sense, as anthropologists have begun to show, is basically a culturally constructed use of experience to
claim self evidence; it is neither more nor less than 'an authoritative story' made out of the familiar."
Robert Ferguson, Untold Stories in the Law, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE
LAW 87 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (emphasis added) (referring to CLIFFORD GEERTZ,
Commonsense as a Cultural System, in GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN
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thus regards this testimony as the most grotesque and hyperbolic
illustration of "the right of the witnesses to be irrelevant, '34 and presumes
it could not possibly bear any legal relevance to Eichmann's case. What
Arendt does not know and does not suspect is that Dinoor was one of the
very few survivors known to have actually met Eichmann at Auschwitz.35
Had he been able to complete his testimony, he would have turned out to
be a material eyewitness.
Yet what K-Zetnik wants is not to prove, but to transmit. The language
of the lawyer and that of the artist meet across the witness stand only to
concretize within the trial their misunderstanding and their missed
encounter.
36
"When the prosecutor invited me to come and testify at the Eichmann
trial," writes K-Zetnik more than twenty years after the trial,
I begged him to release me of this testimony. The prosecutor then
said to me: Mr. Dinoor, this is a trial whose protocol must put on
record testimony proving that there was a place named Auschwitz
and what happened there. The mere sound of these words made me
sick to my stomach, and I said: Sir, describing Auschwitz is beyond
me! Hearing me, his staff eyed me with suspicion. You, the man who
wrote these books, you expect us to believe you can't explain to the
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY, 73 (1983)).
34. ARENDT, supra note 10, at 225.
35. In the documentary of ABC News THE TRIAL OF ADOLPH EICHMANN, supra note 7,
Hausner's wife corroborates this fact, explaining why her husband chose to call K-Zetnik despite the
reluctance of the writer.
36. I analyze this missed encounter and this professional misunderstanding for different purposes
than simply to contrast (as does for instance Mark Osiel) disciplinary differences. Osiel writes:
It is this confessedly subjective experience-irrelevant to criminal law-that oral historians
have only recently sought to explore. In this respect, scholars have perceived the need to
overcome what they perceive as a 'legal' concern with the factual accuracy of personal
testimony in order to apprehend its historical significance. That is, these scholars try to grasp the
meaning of the period's most traumatic events through the continuing memory of those who
lived through its trauma. One such scholar writes:
Testimonies are often labeled as "subjective" or "biased" in the legal proceedings
concerning war crimes. The lawyers of war criminals have asked the most impertinent
questions of people trying to find words for a shattered memory that did not fit into any
language.... They demand precise statements of facts.... A lawyer's case is after all
merely another kind of story.
It is not the task of oral historians to give the kind of evidence required in a court of
law... [Some historians attempt to uncover] the ways in which suffering is remembered and
influences all other memory ... One is dealing with an effort to create a new kind of history
that cannot be used as legal evidence since it explicitly records subjective experience."
Selma Leydersdorff, A Shattered Silence: The Life Stories of Survivors of the Jewish Proletariat at
Amsterdam, in MEMORY AND TOTALITARIANISM 145, 147-48 (Luisa Passerini ed., 1992), quoted and
surveyed in OSIEL, supra note 3, at 103-04.
My own interest is not in contrasting the historical recording of trauma with that of the law, but on
the contrary in exploring and in analyzing ways in which collective trauma is apprehended (and
misapprehended) by the law, and ways in which the very limits of the law in its encounter (or its
missed encounter) with the phenomenon of trauma reveal precisely cultural aspects of its traumatic
meaning.
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judges what Auschwitz was? I fell silent. How could I tell them that I
am consumed by the search for the word that will express the look in
the eyes of those who headed toward the crematorium, when they
passed me with their gaze inside my eyes? The prosecutor was not
convinced, and I appeared at the Eichmann trial. Then came the
judges' first question about Auschwitz and no sooner did I squeeze
out a few miserable sentences than I dropped to the floor and was
hospitalized half paralyzed and disfigured in my face.37
Trauma and the Language of the Law
"'Mr. Dinoor,"' goes Arendt's contrapuntal narrative, "'please, please
listen to Mr. Hausner and to me.' In response, the disappointed witness,
probably deeply wounded, fainted and answered no more questions."38
Follows Arendt's serious commentary on her own sarcastic and
laughingly didactic tale:
This, to be sure, was an exception, but if it was an exception that
proved the rule of normality, it did not prove the rule of simplicity or
of ability to tell a story, let alone of the rare capacity for
distinguishing between things that had happened to the storyteller
more than sixteen, and sometimes twenty, years ago, and what he had
read and heard and imagined in the meantime.39
For these very reasons, Nuremberg at the war's end excluded living
witnesses and limited the evidence to documents, opting for a case of legal
invulnerability that only the non-human and non-living paper evidence
could guarantee. "The documents," said Jackson, "could not be accused of
partiality, forgetfulness, or invention .... Witnesses," on the other hand,
"many of them persecuted and hostile to the Nazis, would always be
chargeable with bias, faulty recollection, and even perjury."4 In a similar
vein, Arendt disqualifies K-Zetnik as a witness because his testimony fails
to meet legal criteria and fails to be contained by the authority of the
restrictive safeguards of the legal rules. In Jackson's spirit, out of concern
for the law as representative of culture and as the arbiter of truth in
history, Arendt excludes K-Zetnik's discourse because it stands for the
contamination between facts and fiction-for the confusion and the
interpenetration between law and literature-that the law in principle
cannot accept and has to resolutely, rigidly rule out.
By legal standards, K-Zetnik represents for Arendt a communicative
failure. I will argue here that Arendt in her turn represents, in more than
37. KA-TZETNIK, supra note 12, at 32 (translation modified by author according to Hebrew
original, supra note 12, at 50).
38. ARENDT, supra note 10, at 224.
39. Id.
40. Jackson, supra note 2, at xxxv-xxxvi.
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one sense, in her stance toward K-Zetnik, the limits of the law in its
encounter with the phenomenon of trauma.4
I would like now to contrast Arendt's interpretation of K-Zetnik's legal
failure with my own reading of this courtroom scene.
IV
Intrusions
What Arendt's irony illuminates is how the law is used as a
straightjacket to tame history as madness.
Arendt's sarcastically positivistic vision of K-Zetnik's failure makes a
positivistic recourse to a summarily explanatory psychological
vocabulary, through which the legal vision overrides (and Arendt
condescendingly dismisses) the witness's (narcissistic) subjectivity. "In
response, the disappointed witness, probably deeply wounded, fainted and
answered no more questions."42
Against this simplifying psychological vocabulary, I will propose to use
a psychoanalytic one informed by jurisprudential trauma theory.43 I will
combine thereby a psychoanalytic with a philosophical and legal reading
of this courtroom scene.
Out of the witness stand falls, in my vision, not a "disappointed
witness," but a terrified one. The witness is not "deeply wounded," but is
retraumatized. The trial reenacts the trauma.
I have argued elsewhere that the law is, so to speak, professionally blind
to its constitutive and structural relation to both private and collective,
cultural trauma, and that its "forms of judicial blindness" take shape
wherever the structure of the trauma unwittingly takes over the structure
of a trial and wherever the legal institution, unawares, triggers a legal
repetition of the trauma that it puts on trial or attempts to cure. 44 In K-
Zetnik's case, this happens punctually.
When the judge admonishes Dinoor from the authoritarian position of
the bench, coercing him into a legal mode of discourse and demanding his
cooperation as a witness, K-Zetnik undergoes severe traumatic shock in
re-experiencing the same terror and panic that dumbfounded him each
41. On the relation between trauma and the law, see Shoshana Felman, Forms of Judicial
Blindness: Traumatic Narratives and Legal Repetitions, in MEMORY, HISTORY AND THE LAW 25
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999).
42. ARENDT, supra note 10, at 224.
43. For my own "jurisprudential trauma theory," see Felman, supra note 41. For trauma theory in
general and its importance in the humanities, see, e.g., Bessel A. Van der Kolk & Onno Van der Hart,
The Intrusive Past: The Flexibility of Memory and the Engraving of Trauma, in TRAUMA:
EXPLORATIONS IN MEMORY 158 (Cathy Caruth ed., 1995); CATHY CARUTH, UNCLAIMED
EXPERIENCE: TRAUMA, NARRATIVE AND HISTORY (1996).
44. See Felman, supra note 41, at 25-93.
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time when, as an inmate, he was suddenly confronted by the inexorable
Nazi authorities of Auschwitz. The judge's words are heard not as an
utterance originating from the present of the courtroom situation, but as a
censure uttered from within "the other planet," as an intrusive threat
articulated right out of the violence of the traumatic scene that is replaying
in K-Zetnik's mind.45 The call to order by the judge urging the witness to
obey-strictly to answer questions and to follow legal rules-impacts the
witness physically as an invasive call to order by an SS officer. Once
more, the imposition of a heartless and unbending rule of order violently
robs him of his words and, in reducing him to silence, once more threatens
to annihilate him, to erase his essence as a human witness. Panicked, K-
Zetnik loses consciousness. 46 He will later write about his unrelenting
Auschwitz nightmares:
In a trembling I lift my eyes to see the face of God in its letters, and
see in front of me the face of an SS man.47
I grow terrified.... The rules here are invisible.... No telling what's
permitted and what's prohibited.4"
I was seized by fear and trembling. I am crying of dread. I want to
hide my face and not be seen. But there is no escape from Auschwitz.
There is no hiding place in Auschwitz.49
Between Life and Death: Frontier Evidence
Prior to his fainting spell, at the point where the prosecutor interrupts
him, K-Zetnik tries to define Auschwitz by re-envisaging the terrifying
moment of Selection, of repeated weekly separation between inmates
chosen for an imminent extermination and inmates arbitrarily selected for
life. This moment is ungraspable, the witness tries to say:
And the inhabitants of that planet had no names. They had neither
parents nor children.... They did not live, nor did they die, in
45. On the phenomenon of intrusive memory and of traumatic repetition prevalent in the
aftermath of trauma, see for instance, Van der Kolk & Van der Hart, supra note 43.
46. This terrified collapse is at the same time an improbable act of resistance, a gesture of
defiance of the court and of its ruling.
47. KA-TZETNIK, supra note 12, at 9 (translation modified by author according to Hebrew
original, supra note 12, at 24). 1 will use this literary, autobiographical narrative written subsequently
by K-Zetnik to describe his psychiatric therapy from his recurrent Auschwitz nightmares, to
retrospectively illuminate the drama of the courtroom scene.
48. Id. at 95 (translation modified by author according to Hebrew original, supra note 12, at 107).
49. Id. at 40 (translation modified by author according to Hebrew original, supra note 12, at 57).
Compare: "But I have no choice. I am unable to answer questions. In general I cannot sustain
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accordance with the laws of this world. Their names were the
numbers.... They left me, they kept leaving me, left.., for close to
two years they left me and always left me behind ... I see them, they
are watching me, I see them...50
What K-Zetnik keeps reliving of the death camp is the moment of
departure, the last gaze of the departed, the exchange of looks between the
dying and the living at the very moment in which life and death are
separating but are still tied up together and can for the last time see each
other eye to eye.
"Even those who were there don't know Auschwitz," writes K-Zetnik in
a later memoir:
Not even someone who was there for two long years as I was.
For Auschwitz is another planet, whereas we humankind, occupants
of the planet Earth, we have no key to decipher the code-name
Auschwitz. How could I dare defile the look in the eyes of those who
head toward the crematorium? They passed me, they knew where
they were going, and I knew where they were going. Their eyes are
looking at me and my eyes are looking at them, the eyes of the going
in the eyes of the remaining, under silent skies above the silent earth.
Only that look in the eyes and the last silence.
For two years they passed me and their look was inside my
eyes.5'
A Community of Death, or Giving Voice to What Cannot Be Said
In constantly reliving through the moment of departure the repeated
separation between life and death, what K-Zetnik testifies to is, however,
not the separation or the difference between life and death but on the
contrary their interpenetration, their ultimate resemblance. On the witness
stand, he keeps reliving his connection to the dead, his bond to the
exterminated. His loyalty to them is symbolized by his adopted name K-
Zetnik, with which he signs, he says, the stories that in fact are theirs:
Since then this name testifies on all my books ....
I am a man! .. . A man who wants to live!
"You have forgotten to write your name on the manuscript....
50. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 11, at 1237.
51. Id. at x-xi (translation modified by author according to Hebrew original, supra note 12, at 8-
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"The nameless, they themselves! The anonymous! Write their
name: K-Zetnik. ' 5
2
How could I explain that it was not me who wrote the book; they
who went to the crematorium as anonymous, they wrote the book!
They, the anonymous narrators.... For two years they passed before
me on their way to the crematorium and left me behind.53
All of them are now buried in me and continue to live in me. I
made an oath to them to be their voice, and when I got out of
Auschwitz they went with me, they and the silent blocks, and the
silent crematorium, and the silent horizons, and the mountain of
ashes. 4
In a way K-Zetnik on the witness stand is not alone. He is accompanied by
those who left him but who live within him. "I made an oath to them to be
their voice." The writer K-Zetnik therefore could symbolically be viewed
as the most central witness to the trial's announced project to give voice to
the six million dead. K-Zetnik's testimony and his literary project pick up
on the prosecutor's legal project.
When I stand before you, Judges of Israel, in this court [-the
prosecutor said in his opening address-] I do not stand alone. With
me... stand six million prosecutors. But alas, they cannot rise to
level the finger of accusation in the direction of the glass dock and
cry out J'accuse against the man who sits there. For their ashes are
piled in the hills of Auschwitz... Their blood cries to Heaven, but
their voice cannot be heard. Thus it falls to me to be their mouthpiece
and to deliver the awesome indictment in their name."
Between Two Names
Because he is in turn speaking for the dead, K-Zetnik must remain, like
them, anonymous and nameless. He must testify, that is, under the name
K-Zetnik 6 His memory of Auschwitz is the oblivion of his name. But in a
court of law, a witness cannot remain nameless, and cannot testify
52. Id. at 16 (translation modified by author according to Hebrew original, supra note 12, at 32).
53. Id. at x-xi (translation modified by author according to Hebrew original, supra note 12, at 33)
54. Id. at 18 (translation modified by author according to Hebrew original, supra note 12, at 34).
55. Criminal Case 40/61 (Jerusalem), Attorney General v. Eichmann, translated in 1 THE TRIAL
OF ADOLPH EICHMANN, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF JERUSALEM, Session
No. 6, Apr. 17, 1967, Jerusalem 1962, at 62 [hereinafter 1 PROCEEDINGS], quoted in HAUSNER, supra
note 4, at 323-24; ARENDT, supra note 10, at 260.
56. Under this name with which he signs his literary work and which materializes his oath to the
dead, Dinoor continues not just to remember those who left him, but also, as a writer, to give literary
voice to their last look and to their final silence.
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anonymously. A witness is accountable precisely to his legal, given name.
"Mr. Dinoor, please, please listen to Mr. Hausner and to me, 57 says the
presiding judge impatiently, putting an end to the account that the witness
gives of his adopted name.
K-Zetnik faints because he cannot be interpellated at this moment by his
legal name, Dinoor: the dead still claim him as their witness, as K-Zetnik
who belongs to them and is still one of them. The court reclaims him as its
witness, as Dinoor. He cannot bridge the gap between the two names and
the two claims. He plunges into the abyss between the different planets.
On the frontier between the living and the dead, between the present and
the past, he falls as though he were himself a corpse.
V
Unmastered Past
Having no interest in socio-psychological or psychoanalytical
phenomena, Arendt has neither a profound insight into nor an interest in
trauma. She has an interest, however, in its legal remedy-in the trial as a
means to overcome and to subdue a traumatic past. But K-Zetnik does not
seize his legal chance to overcome the trauma on the witness stand. He is
rather once more overcome by it. What is worse, he makes a spectacle of
his scandalous collapse within the legal forum. K-Zetnik thus defeats the
purpose of the law, which is precisely to translate the trauma into
consciousness. He loses consciousness and loses his self-mastery, whereas
the purpose of the law is on the contrary to get under control and to regain
a conscious mastery over the traumatic nightmare of a history whose
impact, Arendt recognizes in her non-pathetic, understated style, continues
to have repercussions in the world's consciousness and thus remains with
all of us precisely as the world's, Israel's as well as Germany's
"unmastered past."58
At the heart of the "unmastered past," the trial tries to master an abyss.5 9
57. THE TRIAL OF ADOLPH EICHMANN, supra note 7 (author's literal transcription) (emphasis
added).
58. "It now appeared," writes Arendt,
that the era of the Hitler regime, with its gigantic, unprecedented crimes, constituted an
"unmastered past" not only for the German people or the Jews all over the world, but for the
rest of the world, which had not forgotten this great catastrophe in the heart of Europe either,
and had also been unable to come to terms with it. Moreover-and this was perhaps less
expected-general moral questions, with all their intricacies and modem complexities, which I
would never have suspected would haunt men's minds today and weigh heavily on their hearts,
stood suddenly in the foreground of public concern.
ARENDT, supra note 10, at 283 (emphasis added).
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Trials and Abysses
K-Zetnik's loss of consciousness materializes in the courtroom what the
trial cannot master: at once an abyss of trauma and an epistemological
abyss, a cognitive rupture that Arendt, unrelatedly, will theorize and
underscore in her political and philosophical account of the Nazi
genocide.6 ° Arendt in turn experienced this epistemological abyss when
the news of Auschwitz reached her for the first time as a shock that could
not be assimilated. "What was decisive," Arendt confides to Gunter Gaus
in a German radio interview in 1964,
was the day we learnt about Auschwitz. That was in 1943. And at
first we didn't believe it... because militarily it was unnecessary and
uncalled for. My husband.., said don't be gullible, don't take these
stories at face value. They can't go that far! And then a half-year later
we believed it after all, because we had the proof. That was the real
shock. Before that we said: Well one has enemies. That is entirely
natural. Why shouldn't a people have enemies? But this was
different. It was really as if an abyss had opened.61
But despite the shock, despite the cognitive rupture and the
epistemological gap in history and in historical perception, Arendt's life
consists in crossing the abyss and overstepping it, beyond the rupture it
has left. It later seems to Arendt, as she says to Gunter Gaus, that "there
should be a basis for communication precisely in the abyss of
Auschwitz., 62  The law provides a forum and a language for such
60. This abyss, this epistemological rupture, is what the Eichmann trial and its "monumental
history" (at once the prosecution's case and the text of the judgment) precisely fails to perceive in
Arendt's eyes. "I have insisted," Arendt writes,
on ... how little Israel, and the Jewish people in general, was prepared to recognize, in the
crimes that Eichmann was accused of, an unprecedented crime.... In the eyes of the Jews,
thinking exclusively in terms of their own history, the catastrophe that had befallen them under
Hitler, in which a third of the people perished, appeared not as the most recent of crimes, the
unprecedented crime of genocide, but on the contrary, as the oldest crime they knew and
remembered. This misunderstanding... is actually at the root of all the failures and the
shortcomings of the Jerusalem trial. None of the participants ever arrived at a clear
understanding of the actual horror of Auschwitz, which is of a different nature from all the
atrocities of the past.... Politically and legally ... these were "crimes" different not only in
degree of seriousness but in essence.
ARENDT, supra note 10, at 267.
Compare Arendt's insistence in her 1946 letter to Jaspers on the abyss that, henceforth inhabiting
both guilt and innocence, explodes the tool of law in bursting open all legal frameworks: "The Nazi
crimes, it seems to me, explode the limits of the law .... this guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt,
oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems. That is the reason why the Nazis in Nuremberg are so
smug .... and just as inhuman as their guilt is the innocence of the victims .... This is the abyss that
opened up before us as early as 1933... and into which we have finally stumbled. I don't know how
we will ever get out of it." Letter from Arendt to Japsers, supra note 20 (emphasis added).
61. HANNAH ARENDT, "What Remains? " The Language Remains: A Conversation with Gunther
Gaus, in ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING, 1930-1954, at 13-14, (Jerome Kottn ed., 1994).
62. Id. at 14.
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I would argue that the Eichmann trial is, for Arendt, quite precisely
what she calls "the basis for communication" in and over the abyss of
Auschwitz. But K-Zetnik's plunge into a coma interrupts the process of
communication painstakingly established by the law. K-Zetnik has
remained too close to the reality and to the shock of the event, perhaps too
close for Arendt's comfort. He is still a captive of the planet of the ashes.
He is still in the Holocaust, still on the brink of the abyss, which he
unwittingly reopens in the courtroom when the law has barely started to
construct its legal bridge.
The law requires that the witness should be able to narrate a story in the
past, to recount an event in the past tense. K-Zetnik is unable to regard the
Holocaust as past event but must relive it in the present, through the
infinite traumatic repetition of a past that is not past, that has no closure
and from which no distance can be taken.
Law, on the contrary, requires and provides distance from the
Holocaust. Its inquiry and judgment are contingent on a separation
between past and present. Law requires and brings closure and totalization
of the evidence and of its meaning. This is why K-Zetnik's testimony,
which defies at once legal reduction and legal closure, must remain
unrealized, unfinished.
PART Two: EVIDENCE IN LAW AND EVIDENCE IN ART
VI
Between Law and Art
In 1964, a leading avant-garde literary critic in America, Susan Sontag,
in a discussion of a German literary work about the role played by the
Pope during the Holocaust, surprisingly and quite provocatively argued
that the Eichmann trial was "the most interesting and moving work of art
of the past ten years. "63
63. Susan Sontag, Reflections on The Deputy, in THE STORM OVER THE DEPUTY 18 (Eric Bentley
ed., 1964). This comment was, of course, an utterly astonishing remark whose value lay in the surprise
that it reserved, in its unsettling power with respect to any simple-minded or reductive legalistic
understanding of the trial. Provocatively, Sontag argued that there was a dimension in the trial that was
excessive to its legal definition. She called this dimension "art," because she felt the trial left an
impact on the audience that was, in its strength and depth, comparable to the expressive power of a
work of art. The trial moved her and existentially and philosophically engaged her. Sontag insisted
therefore that the trial had a literary meaning in addition to its legal meaning, and that this extra-legal
meaning was somehow utterly important for a full grasp of what was at stake in this event of law. The
value of Sontag's interpretation lies, in my eyes, not in its axiomatic categorization of the trial as a
work of art (a categorization I cannot accept), but in the power of this unexpected categorization to
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We live in a time in which tragedy is not an art form but a form of
history. Dramatists no longer write tragedies. But we do have works
of art (not always recognized as such) which attempt to resolve the
great historical tragedies of our time.... If then the supreme tragic
event of modem times is the murder of six million Jews, the most
interesting and moving work of art of the past ten years is the trial of
Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961.6
I do not believe, for my part, that the Eichmann trial-or any trial--can
be reduced to, or subsumed in, the performance or the drama of a work of
art. There is at least one crucial difference between an event of law and an
event of art, no matter how dramatic they both are: A work of art cannot
sentence to death. A trial, unlike art, is grounded in the sanctioned legal
violence it has the power (and sometimes the duty) to enact. 65
While it cannot be accepted at face value, Sontag's paradoxical remark
about the Eichmann trial is nevertheless illuminating, not as a comment
about trials, but as an observation about art's relation to (juridical) reality.
While the Eichmann trial can under no circumstances be regarded as a
work of art, works of art have come today to imitate, to replicate or to
mimic the legal structures of the Eichmann trial.
The strongest and most eloquent example of this trend (that reached its
climax decades after Sontag's article) can be seen in the film Shoah by
Claude Lanzmann, a work of art made of reality whose legal, testimonial
format is informed (and perhaps inspired) by the Eichmann trial66 and of
which it could indeed be said, in Sontag's words, that it is "the most
interesting and moving work of art of the past years."6 7
64. Id. at 118-19. Art, says Sontag, no longer stands in opposition to reality: While twentieth-
century reality becomes more and more hallucinated, more and more divorced from what we used to
call reality, art moves closer to reality than it ever was before, and mixes in with its jurisprudential
gestures. Art no longer is a statement: it is an intervention in a conflict, an action, a commitment, an
engagement. It is politicized and de-aestheticized. A "work of art" no longer is aesthetics: It is politics.
See id.
65. See ROBERT COVER, Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE
ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203 (Martha Minow, Michael Ryan & Austin Sarat eds., 1995).
66. Shoah borrows some of its main witnesses from the Eichmann trial. The most striking
example is that of Simon Srebnik, whose extraordinary testimony was first heard during the
proceedings of the Eichmann trial. Compare Session No. 66, in 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 11, at
1197-1201, with Shoah's extraordinarily moving opening scene, in SHOAH, THE COMPLETE TEXT OF
THE FILM BY CLAUDE LANZMANN (1985).
67. Like the Eichmann trial, Lanzmann's film puts in evidence before the audience a fact-finding
process whose goal is-like that of the legal process-to elicit truth and to prohibit its evasions.
Lanzmann borrows his procedures-his techniques of cross-examination and of detailed, concrete
interrogation-from the legal model of a trial. Like the Eichmann trial, Shoah hears testimonies in a
multiplicity of languages and uses an interpreter to simultaneously translate them into the language of
its legal process. And like the Eichmann trial, the film wishes not only toprove but to transmit. "'My
problem,' Lanzmann says, 'was to transmit. To do that one cannot allow oneself to be overwhelmed
with emotion. You must remain detached.... I tried rather to reach people through their
intelligence."' Shoshana Felman, The Return of the Voice, in SHOSHANA FELMAN & DOR LAUB,
TESTIMONY: CRISES OF WITNESSING IN HISTORY, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND LITERATURE 204, 239
(1992) (quoting Claude Lanzmann) (citation omitted). For a more elaborate study of the film Shoah,
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I speak here of Shoah as emblematic of art after the Holocaust and as
paradigmatic of the work of art of our times. I argue that the Eichmann
trial is the complementary event (the legal correlative) of the
contemporary process of art's invasion by the structures of the trial and of
its transformation into testimony, a process by which writers like K-Zetnik
(like Elie Wiesel, Celan, Camus and others) have precisely vowed to make
of art itself a witness, to present, that is, historical and legal evidence by
means of art. What, then, is the difference between law and art when both
are underwritten by the legal process and when both vow to pursue
reality? "Reality," says Arendt, "is different from, and more than, the
totality of facts and events, which anyhow is unascertainable. Who says
what is . . . always tells a story."68 In Arendt's words, I argue that law's
story focuses on ascertaining the totality of facts and events. Art's story
focuses on what is different from, and more than, that totality. I argue that
the breakdown of the witness in the Eichmann trial was (unwittingly) at
once part of the totality of facts and part of what was different from, and
more than, that totality. In that sense, it was inadvertently law's story and
art's story at the same time. "The truth" says Lanzmann, "kills the
possibility of fiction."69 In the same way that art is today transpierced,
invaded by the language and the structures of the trial, the Eichmann
trial-through K-Zetnik's court appearance-was transpierced, invaded
by the artist's language, by the artist's testimony and by the artist's
astonishing collapse.
The artist's language cannot relegate traumatic suffering to the past.
"The worst moral and artistic crime that can be committed in producing a
work dedicated to the Holocaust," says Lanzmann, "is to consider the
Holocaust as past. Either the Holocaust is legend or it is present: in no
case is it a memory. A film devoted to the Holocaust... can only be an
investigation into the present of the Holocaust or at least into a past whose
scars are still so freshly and vividly inscribed in certain places and in the
consciences of some people that it reveals itself in a hallucinated
timelessness."7 In a similar way, K-Zetnik does not treat the Holocaust as
past but lives it as a present that endlessly repeats itself in a hallucinated
timelessness. The hallucinated timelessness-the time of traumatic
repetition and the time of art-is the precise time of K-Zetnik's legal
testimony. But legal temporality cannot admit, cannot include, cannot
acknowledge timelessness except as rupture of the legal frame. K-Zetnik's
court appearance marks, thus, an invasion of the trial and of legal
see id.
68. ARENDT, Truth and Politics, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 227, 261 (Penguin Books 1993)
(1961).
69. Deborah Jerome, Resurrecting Horror: The Man Behind Shoah, RECORD, Oct. 25, 1985
(interviewing Claude Lanzmann).
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temporality by the endless, timeless temporality of art.
Law is a language of abbreviation, of limitation and totalization. Art is a
language of infinity and of the irreducibility of fragments, a language of
embodiment, of incarnation and of embodied incantation or of endless
rhythmic repetition. Because it is by definition a discipline of limits, law
distances the Holocaust; art brings it closer. The function of the judgment
in the Eichmann trial was paradoxically to totalize and distance the event:
The trial made a past out of the Holocaust.7 And yet, within the
courtroom, in the figure of K-Zetnik, the Holocaust returned as a ghost or
as an incarnated, living present.
K-Zetnik's discourse in the trial has remained unfinished and, like art,
interminable. In the courtroom, its lapse into interminability-into
unconsciousness and silence-was paradoxically a physical reminder of
the real, a physical reminder of a bodily reality that fractured the totality
of facts sought by the law. But the testimonial power of this real, of this
irreducible bodily presence of the witness, lay precisely in the pathos-in
the crying power-of its legal muteness.
"But what can I do when I'm struck mute?" K-Zetnik will write almost
thirty years after the Eichmann trial, in trying to explain at once the legal
failure of his testimony and the very principle of interminability and
inexhaustibility of his continued testimonial art:
But what can I do when I'm struck mute? I have neither word nor
name for it all. Genesis says: "And Adam gave names..." When
God finished creating the earth and everything upon it, Adam was
asked to give names to all that God had created. Till 1942 there was
no Auschwitz in existence. For Auschwitz there is no name other
than Auschwitz. My heart will be ripped to pieces if I say, "In
Auschwitz they burned people alive!" Or "In Auschwitz people died
of starvation." But that is not Auschwitz. People have died of
starvation before, and people did bum alive before. But that is not
Auschwitz. What, then, is Auschwitz? I have no words to express it; I
don't have a name for it. Auschwitz is a primal phenomenon. I don't
have the key to unlock it. But don't the tears of the mute speak his
anguish? And don't his screams cry his distress? Don't his bulging
eyes reveal the horror? I am that mute.72
Muteness in a courtroom is normally negative or void, devoid of legal
meaning. Muteness in art, however, can be fraught with meaning. It is out
71. On the historicizing role of the judges and more generally on the relation between law and
history, see the remarkable analysis of Michal Shaked, Hahistoriah Beveit Hamishpat Uveit
Hamishpat Bahistoria. Piskei Hadin Bemishpat Kastner Vehanarrativim Shel Hazikaron [History in
Court and the Court in History: The Opinions in the Kastner Trial and the Narratives of Memory], 20
ALPAIM 36 (2000).
72. KA-TZETNIK, supra note 12, at 31-32 (translation modified by author according to K-ZETNIK,
supra note 12, at 49).
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of its muteness that K-Zetnik's writing in this passage speaks. It is out of
its silence that his testimonial art derives its literary power. Art is what
makes silence speak.
I would argue that it was precisely through K-Zetnik's legal muteness
that the trial inadvertently gave silence a transmitting power, and-
although not by intention-managed to transmit the legal meaning of
collective trauma with the incremental power of a work of art. Once the
trial gave transmissibility to silence, other silences became, within the
trial, fraught with meaning.73 At the limit of what could be legally
grasped, something of the order of K-Zetnik's mute cry-something of the
order of the speechlessness and of the interminability of art-was present
in the courtroom as a silent shadow of the trial or as a negative of the
proceedings. It was present in the interstices of the law as a ghost inside
the house of justice. The poet Haim Gouri noted in his coverage of the
trial:
With an unmatched force, the court has managed to restrain the
crushing power of the cry that burst out, now as if for the first time,
and to transmit it partially into a language of facts and numbers and




Unlike K-Zetnik's testimony, the Eichmann trial did have closure. For
his crimes against the Jewish people, his war crimes and his crimes against
humanity, the judges sentenced Eichmann to "the greatest penalty known
to the law."75 The judgment totalized a statement of the evidence. Like
73. See ARENDT, supra note 10, at 231 ("During the few minutes it took Kovner to tell of the help
that had come from a German sergeant, a hush settled over the courtroom; it was as though the crowd
had spontaneously decided to observe the usual two minutes of silence in honor of the man named
Anton Schmidt.").
There were moments in which even the prosecutors were overcome by silence and, for a minute,
could not go on. On these inadvertent moments of silence, compare the retrospective testimony of
Justice Gabriel Bach, at the time assistant prosecutor in the Eichmann trial, in the documentary film
THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN, supra note 7, with HAUSNER, supra note 4, at 324-25:
The story of the extermination in Poland followed, and the wholesale killings by the
Einsatzgruppen ... There, I knew, words could not describe the mass shooting of close to a
million and four hundred thousand people before open pits. I cut short the address and read,
instead, a lullaby composed at the time in the Wilno ghetto... When I finished reading there
was silence for a moment. I simply could not go on. Fortunately it was almost 6 p.m., about time
for the adjournment of the session. The presiding judge must have realized my predicament; he
asked whether this was a convenient place to stop. I nodded thankfully.
74. GOURI, supra note 17, at 244.
75. Reading of the Judgment of the District Court, 5 THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHHMANN, RECORD
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Arendt, the judges underscored the fact that their authority of doing justice
(and of making justice seen) was contingent on the force of limitation of
the law. "The Judgement in the Eichmann case," Arendt reports for once
approvingly, "could not have been clearer":
All attempts to widen the range of the trial had to be resisted, because
the court "could not allow itself to be enticed into provinces which
are outside its sphere .... The judicial process [-wrote the judges-
] has ways of its own, which are laid down by law, and which do not
change, whatever the subject of the trial may be." The court,
moreover, could not overstep these limits without ending "in
complete failure." Not only does it not have at its disposal "the tools
required for the investigation of general questions, it speaks with an
authority whose very weight depends upon its limitation."76
And yet, even the judges felt the need to point to the fact that there was
something in the trial that went beyond their jurisdiction and beyond the
jurisdiction of the law. Thus they wrote:
If these be the sufferings of the individual, then the sum total of the
suffering of the millions-about a third of the Jewish people, tortured
and slaughtered-is certainly beyond human understanding, and who
are we to try to give it adequate expression? This is a task for the
great writers and poets. Perhaps it is symbolic that even the author
who himself went through the hell named Auschwitz, could not stand
the ordeal in the witness box and collapsed.77
What the judges say is not simply that law and art are two modes of
transmission of the Holocaust, two languages in which to translate the
incomprehensible into some sort of sense, two modes of coping with
collective trauma and of crossing the abyss of a mad and nightmarish
history.
The judges recognize that even in the legal mode, within the language
of the trial, the collapse of the writer and his breakdown as a witness were
endowed with meaning. They further recognize that when the artist lapsed
into unconsciousness, a dimension of infinitude and interminability has
registered itself within the trial as what was uncontainable by its
containment, as what remained untotalizable precisely by and in the law's
totalization, within the very legal text of the totalization that constitutes
their judgment.
The judgment in the Eichmann trial takes note of the fact that, in the
OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF JERUSALEM, Session No. 121 (Dec. 15, 1961), Jerusalem
1964, at 2218 [hereinafter 5 PROCEEDINGS].
76. ARENDT, supra note 10, at 253-54 (emphasis added). "Hence," Arendt concludes, "to the
question most commonly asked about the Eichmann trial: What good does it do? there is but one
possible answer: It will do justice." Id. at 254.
77. 5 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 75, at 2146 (emphasis added).
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meeting point between law and art with which the courtroom was
unwittingly confronted through K-Zetnik's testimony, the law has
dialogued with its own limits and has touched upon a boundary of
meaning in which sense and senselessness, meaning and madness
seriously, historically commingled and could not be told apart. The court
acknowledges, however, that this surprising legal moment that unsettled
legal norms and threw the courtroom into disarray was a profoundly
meaningful and not senseless moment of the trial.
PART THREE: TRAUMATIC NARRATIVES AND LEGAL FRAMES
VIII
Story and Anti-Story: Between Justice and the Impossibility of Telling
I want now to return to Arendt's story, but to return to Arendt's story
differently: to listen not just to her statement, but to her utterance; to seek
to understand not only her juridical critique, but her own inadvertent
testimony as a writer. I propose to show how Arendt's legal narrative in
Eichmann in Jerusalem unwittingly encapsulates not only the reporter's
critical account, but also the thinker's own (erased) artistic testimony and
the writer's own traumatic narrative. 78
Like the judges, Arendt views K-Zetnik's fainting as a symbol. 79 But
while for the judges, the writer's collapse encapsulates-within the trial
and beyond it-the collapse of language in the face of uncontainable and
unintelligible suffering, for Arendt, the writer's collapse encapsulates the
legal failure of the trial. While for the judges, the collapse is a
dramatization of a failure of expression, for Arendt, the collapse is a
dramatization of a failure of narration.
"This," says Arendt, "to be sure, was an exception, but if it was an
exception that proved the rule of normality, it did not prove the rule of
simplicity or of ability to tell a story."80 As an exception that confirms the
rule of normality, that is, as a symbol of the legal abnormality of the trial
as a whole, Arendt faults K-Zetnik for his inability to tell a story, and thus
to testify coherently. "Who says what is... always tells a story, and in
this story the particular facts lose their contingency and acquire some
78. In her own turn, Arendt narrates not only the totality of facts, but also what is different from,
and more than, that totality. Arendt's encounter with the Eichmann trial in turn partakes not only of
law's story but also (mutely, indirectly) of art's story, or more precisely of the way in which law's
story in the trial is transpierced, pervaded by the writer's testimony.
79. "Perhaps it is symbolic," said the judges, "that even the author who himself went through the
hell named Auschwitz, could not stand the ordeal in the witness box and collapsed." 5 PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 75, at 2146; see supra text accompanying note 77.
80. ARENDT, supra note 10, at 224.
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humanly comprehensible meaning," Arendt will write in "Truth and
Politics,"8 doubtless remembering unconsciously the unforgettable essay
called The Storyteller8 2 written by her dead friend Walter Benjamin,
whose name she will in 1968-five years after the Eichmann book-
redeem from anonymity and namelessness by publishing his work in the
United States, but whose lost friendship she will silently mourn all her life
as an intimate grievance, a wordless wound, a personal price that she in
turn has secretly paid to the Holocaust.83 I hear a reference to The
81. "The telling of factual truth comprehends much more than the daily information supplied by
journalists... Reality is different from, and more than, the totality of facts and events which, anyhow,
is unascertainable. Who says what is ... always tells a story, and in this story the particular facts lose
their contingency and acquire some humanly comprehensible meaning." ARENDT, supra note 68, at
261.
82. BENJAMIN, supra note 6.
83. The German-Jewish writer Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) was a friend of Arendt's during
their exile years in Paris. She admired his works and wanted to help him emigrate to the United States,
but he committed suicide during his illegal and aborted escape from France in 1940. In 1942, when
she first learns about the existence of the Nazi death camps, Arendt writes "a poem for her dead friend,
a farewell and a greeting," entitled simply "W.B.:" "[D]istant voices, sadnesses nearby / Those are the
voices and these the dead / whom we have sent as messengers ahead, to lead us into slumber." Quoted
in ELIZABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, HANNAH ARENDT: FOR LOVE OF THE WORLD 162-63 (1982).
The last time Walter Benjamin saw Hannah Arendt in Marseille, he entrusted to her care a
collection of manuscripts he hoped she could deliver to the United States. After his death, Arendt
travels to the cemetery of Port Bou on the Franco-Spanish border only to discover that her dead friend
who was buried there does not even have an individual, named grave. In a letter to Gershom Scholem
written on October 21, 1940 (less than a month after Benjamin's death), Arendt describes the shock of
her realization that in this cemetery, "the most fantastic . .. and beautiful spot" she has ever "seen in
[her] life," there is nothing left to bear witness to Benjamin's life and death: "[His grave] was not to be
found, his name was not written anywhere." Quoted in GERSHOM SCHOLEM, WALTER BENJAMIN: THE
STORY OF A FRIENDSHIP 226 (Harry Zohn trans., Jewish Publication Soc'y of Am. 1981) (1975).
In 1968, Arendt redeems Benjamin from namelessness in publishing his manuscripts in the United
States. In her Introduction to Benjamin's work, Arendt narrates (and mourns) her friend's absurd,
untimely, and tragically ironic (needless) suicide:
On September 26, 1940, Walter Benjamin, who was about to emigrate to America, took his life
at the Franco-Spanish border. There were various reasons for this.., nothing drew him to
America, where, as he used to say, people would probably find no other use for him than to...
exhibit him as "the last European." But the immediate occasion for Benjamin's suicide was an
uncommon stroke of bad luck. Through the armistice agreement between Vichy France and the
Third Reich, refugees from Hitler's Germany... were in danger of being shipped back to
Germany.... [T]o save this category of refugees... the United States had distributed a certain
number of emergency visas through its consulates in unoccupied Europe. Thanks to the efforts
of the Institute in New York, Benjamin was among the first to receive such a visa in Marseilles.
Also, he quickly obtained a Spanish transit visa to enable him to get to Lisbon and board a ship
there. However, he did not have a French exit visa ... which the French government, eager to
please the Gestapo, invariably denied the German refugees. In general this presented no great
difficulty, since a relatively short and none too arduous road to be covered by foot over the
mountains to Port Bou was well known and was not guarded by the French border police. Still,
for Benjamin apparently suffering from cardiac condition.., even the shortest walk was a great
exertion, and he must have arrived in a state of serious exhaustion. The small group of refugees
that he had joined reached the Spanish border town only to learn that Spain had closed the
border that same day and that the border officials did not honor visas made out in Marseilles.
The refugees were supposed to return to France the next day. During the night Benjamin took
his life, whereupon the border officials, upon whom this suicide had made an impression,
allowed his companions to proceed to Portugal. A few weeks later the embargo on visas was
lifted again. One day earlier Benjamin would have got through without any trouble; one day
later the people in Marseilles would have known that for the time being it was impossible to
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Storyteller in the conclusion of Arendt's account of K-Zetnik's testimony:
"[I]t did not prove the rule of simplicity or of ability to tell a story."84
There are several other references in Eichmann in Jerusalem to
storytelling and to The Storyteller." While Benjamin's name is never
pass through Spain. Only on that particular day was the catastrophe possible.
Arendt, Introduction to ILLUMINATIONS, supra note 6, at 5-18; see also Arendt's letter of May 30,
1946 to Gertrude Jaspers, the Jewish wife of the German philosopher (The letter is evoking another
mutual dead acquaintance, and the two correspondents' common personal relation to the Jewish
problem):
Or perhaps he was just tired and didn't want to move on again, didn't want to face a totally alien
world, a totally alien language, and the inevitable poverty, which so often, particularly at first,
comes close to total destitution. This exhaustion, which often went along with the reluctance to
make a big fuss, to summon so much concentration for the sake of this little bit of life, that was
surely the biggest danger we all faced. And it was the death of our best friend in Paris, Walter
Benjamin, who committed suicide in October 1940 on the Spanish border with an American
visa in his pocket. This atmosphere of sauve qui peut at the time was dreadful, and suicide was
the only noble gesture, if you even cared enough to want to perish nobly.... What you wrote
about "our"problem moved me very much.... and today that means our dead.
Letter from Arendt to Gertrude Jaspers (May 30, 1946), in CORRESPONDENCE supra note 20, at 40-41
(emphasis added).
84. ARENDT, supra note 10, at 224.
85. There is another witness who, in contrast to K-Zetnik, did prove the ability to tell a story. His
name is Zyndel Grynszpan, and the story he narrates is that of his forced deportation, at the beginning
of the war, from Germany to Poland. He is in Arendt's eyes the ideal storyteller-the ideal witness-
although no other witness in the trial can live up to his example. His plainly factual and
chronologically coherent narrative stands in contrast to the disjointed account of K-Zetnik. "Now he
had come to tell his story," Arendt writes, "carefully answering questions put to him by the
prosecutor; he spoke clearly and firmly, without embroidery, using a minimum of words." Id. at 228
(emphasis added). Compare Benjamin's similar stylistic preference in The Storyteller:
There is nothing [writes Benjamin] that commends a story to memory more effectively than the
chaste compactness that precludes psychological analysis. And the more natural the process by
which the storyteller forgoes psychological shading, the greater becomes the story's claim to a
place in the memory of the listener, the more completely is it integrated into his own experience,
the greater will be his inclination to repeat it to someone else.
BENJAMIN, supra note 6, at 91.
Arendt indeed repeats verbatim Grynszpan's testimony and does not paraphrase or summarize it, as
she did with K-Zetnik's discourse. Arendt is so remarkably and deeply moved by Grynszpan's
testimony that she steps out of her boundaries and (for a moment) pleads against her own legal
objection to the victim's story and against her own puristic, legalistic emphasis on strict legal
relevance:
This story took no more than perhaps ten minutes to tell, and when it was over-the senseless,
needless destruction of twenty-seven years in less than twenty-four hours--one thought
foolishly: Everyone, everyone should have his day in court. Only to find out, in the endless
sessions that followed, how difficult it was to tell the story, that-at least outside the
transforming realm of poetry-it needed a purity of soul, an unmirrored, unreflected innocence
of heart and mind that only the righteous possess. No one either before or after was to equal the
shining honesty of Zindel Grynszpan.
ARENDT, supra note 10, at 229-30 (emphasis added). The reason Arendt is so overwhelmed with
emotion, I would suggest, is that her own traumatic story of the loss of Germany is unwittingly,
unconsciously reflected back to her from Grynszpan's modest story. This narrative of a forceful
removal across national borders is also Benjamin's story (the cause of his death).
What is significant for my point here, however, is that Arendt describes Grynszpan in Benjamin 's
literal words. The apotheosis of Arendt's uncharacteristic pathos in this passage is a literal stylistic
echo, a literal rhetorical and verbal reminiscence of Benjamin's concluding sentence in The
Storyteller. Benjamin writes in his signature phrase: "The storyteller is the figure in which the
righteous man encounters himself." BENJAMIN, supra note 6, at 109 (emphasis added). Similarly,
resonantly, Grynszpan is described as having "a purity of soul" that "only the righteous possess."
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mentioned and his text is never cited in the book, Benjaminian words and
formulations unwittingly pervade its pages like stylistic echoes that form
an impassioned philosophical subtext under and through the irony, the
wryness, and the dryness of the legalistic text. At stake in this subtext is a
relation between death and writing, an intimately personal relation which
the writing "I" cannot possess or formulate directly, but can relate to
indirectly through Benjamin's reflection on the relation between death and
storytelling. Benjamin's memory and presence-the presence of his death
and of his text-unwittingly yet hauntingly, persistently inform Arendt's
style and permeate her writing and her utterance. "Death," wrote
Benjamin precisely in his essay, "is the sanction of everything that the
storyteller has to tell. He has borrowed his authority from death."86
Has Arendt in her turn borrowed her authority as storyteller of the trial
from a legacy of death of which she does not speak and cannot speak? I
will suggest indeed that, through its understated but repeated reference to
the storyteller, Eichmann in Jerusalem is also Arendt's book of
mourning. 87 It is, in other words, a book-an unarticulated statement-on
the relation between grief and justice, as well as on the counterparts of
grief and justice in narrative and storytelling. "It is perfectly true," Arendt
will write in Truth and Politics, "that 'all sorrows can be borne if you put
ARENDT, supra note 10, at 229.
Another reference to The Storyteller makes itself evident at the beginning of the book. In the first
chapter, in one of her rare moments of self-inclusion, Arendt situates herself as part of the audience of
the trial whose task it is "to face the storyteller."
[The audience] was filled with "survivors," with middle-aged and elderly people, immigrants
from Europe, like myself, who knew by heart all there was to know, and who were in no mood
to learn any lessons.... [A]s witness followed witness and horror was piled on horror, they sat
there and listened in public to stories they would hardly have been able to endure in private,
when they would have had to face the storyteller.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Arendt here places herself significantly among the survivors, those who
inadvertently share with those who took the stand with the knowledge of how difficult it is to tell the
story of survival (to testify at once to life and to the death-the dying-the survival has entailed). The
expression "to face the storyteller" (in which Arendt as a listener and as a survivor also faces herself)
is reminiscent again of Benjamin's Storyteller, in which the listener becomes a storyteller in her turn.
"For storytelling is always the art of repeating stories," writes Benjamin. "The more self-forgetful a
listener is, the more deeply is what he listens to impressed upon his memory... [The listener] listens
to the tales in such a way that the gift of retelling them comes to him all by itself." BENJAMIN, supra
note 6, at 91. It is as though Arendt facing Eichmann in Jerusalem and judging the trial at the level of
her statement were also at the same time, at the level of her utterance, listening to the whisper of
Benjamin's voice reciting, as it were, The Storyteller from his deathbed (like the original narrator in
his essay):
It is... characteristic that not only a man's knowledge or wisdom, but above all his real life-
and this is the stuff that stories are made of-first assumes transmissible form at the moment of
his death. Just as a sequence of images is set in motion inside a man as his life comes to an end,
unfolding the views of himself under which he has encountered himself without being aware of
it-suddenly in his expressions and looks the unforgettable emerges and imparts to everything
that concerned him that that authority which even the poorest wretch in dying possesses for the
living around him. This authority is at the very source of the story.
Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
86. BENJAMIN, supra note 6, at 94.
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them into a story or tell a story about them."'' 8 Both the Eichmann trial
and Arendt's critical rehearsal of it are preoccupied-albeit in different
styles-with the translation of grief into justice. Both are therefore mirror
images of the translation of grief into grievance as what underlies
precisely the capacity and the significance of saying "I accuse," of crying
out J'accuse in the name of those who can no longer say it.89
Eichmann in Jerusalem, I would suggest, is inhabited by Arendt's
mourned and unmourned ghosts. Benjamin is one of those. (Another
ghost, I would suggest, is Heidegger, but I will not dwell here on his
ghostly significance in Eichmann in Jerusalem).90
In all language, Benjamin has argued, there is a lament that mutes it
out.9 "In all mourning there is an inclination to speechlessness, which is
infinitely more than the disinclination or the inability to communicate." 92
Benjamin's unmentioned name and subterranean presence as an
inadvertent and complex subtext of Eichmann in Jerusalem is linked, I
argue, both to Arendt's testimony in this book and to her silence, a silence
which in turn is linked not just to her discretion but to her speechlessness,
that is, to her own inability to tell a story. There is, in other words, a
crucial story Arendt does not tell and cannot tell, which underlies the story
of the trial she does tell. 93
"Familiar though his name may be to us," wrote Benjamin,
the storyteller in his living immediacy is by no means a present force.
He has already become something remote from us and something
which is getting even more distant .... Less and less frequently do
we encounter people with the ability to tell a tale properly .... It is
as if something that seemed inalienable to us. . . were taken from us:
88. ARENDT, supra note 68, at 262. Arendt borrows this sentence from Isak Dinesen, "who not
only was one of the great storytellers of all times but also--and she was almost unique in this
respect-knew what she was doing." Id.
89. Cf Prosecutor's Opening Statement, supra note 55. For an in-depth interpretation of this
statement, see Felman, supra note 18.
90. I am arguing that Benjamin and Heidegger are the two absent addressees of Eichmann in
Jerusalem (symbolically, the German-Jewish casualty and the compromised German philosopher: a
lost friendship and a lost love).
91. "Even where there is only a rustling of plants," Benjamin writes lyrically, "there is always a
lament. Because she is mute, nature mourns... [and] the sadness of nature makes her mute." 1
WALTER BENJAMIN, On Language as Such and on the Language of Man, in SELECTED WRITINGS,
1913-1923, at 73 (Marcus Bollock & Michael W. Jennings eds., Edmund Jephcott trans., 1996).
92. Id.
93. This speechless story is a story of mourning and of the inability to mourn: the story of a
trauma and of the trauma's silencing and willful disavowal. In the middle of the writing of Eichmann
in Jerusalem, Arendt also had a violent car accident from which she almost died: Another brutal inner
rupture, another intimate relation to death which similarly, equally was silenced and has left no visible
mark on the tight argument of the book. Arendt tells Jaspers about this fatal accident:
It seemed to me that for a moment I had my life in my hands. I was quite calm: death seemed to
me natural, in no way a tragedy or, somehow, out of the order of things. But, at the same time, I
said to myself: if it is possible to do so decently, I would really like, still, to stay in this world.
Quoted in YOUNG-BRUEHL, supra note 83, at 335 (emphasis added).
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the ability to exchange experiences.94
Benjamin intuitively knew that the inability to tell a story was related to
the essence of traumatic experience.95 Specifically, he linked this inability
to tell to the collective, massive trauma of the war. "Was it not noticeable
at the end of the war that men returned from the battlefield grown silent-
not richer, but poorer in communicable experience?" '96
Benjamin spoke of the First World War.97 K-Zetnik's testimony at the
Eichmann trial showed how people have returned even more tongue-
tied-even poorer in communicable experience, grown even more silent-
from the death camps and from the traumatic nightmare of the Second
World War. "When I got out of Auschwitz," writes K-Zetnik, "they went
with me, they and the silent blocks, and the silent crematorium, and the
silent horizons, and the mountain of ashes."98
I would argue differently from Arendt (and with hindsight she could not
possess) that (unpredictably, unwittingly) it was the inadvertent legal
essence and legal innovation and uniqueness of the Eichmann trial, and
not its testimonial accident, to voice the muteness generated by the
Holocaust and to articulate the dfficulty of articulation of the catastrophic
story, the difficulty of articulation and the tragic unnarratability of the
ungraspable disaster and of its immeasurably devastating, unintelligible
trauma. The impossibility of telling is not external to this story: It is the
story's heart.99 The trial shows how the inherent inability to tell the story
94. BENJAMIN, supra note 6, at 83.
95. "It is only for convenience that we speak of... 'traumatic memory,"' writes the psychiatrist
Pierre Janet. "The subject is often incapable of making the necessary narrative which we call memory
regarding the event; and yet he remains confronted by a difficult situation in which he has not been
able to play a satisfactory part." Quoted in Van der Kolk & Van der Hart, supra note 43, at 160
(emphasis added).
96. BENJAMIN, supra note 6, at 84.
97. On Benjamin's relation to the First World War and on the role of silence and of trauma in his
work, see Shoshana Felman, Benjamin's Silence, 25 CRITICAL INQUIRY 201 (1999).
98. KA-TZETNIK, supra note 12, at 18 (translation modified by author according to Hebrew
original, supra note 12, at 34.
99. The importance of the story element in trials is by now a commonplace in legal scholarship.
What is less well known is that, to the extent that trauma is what cannot be narrated (Benjamin, Janet),
it also incorporates the paradoxical story of an inherent resistance to storytelling. Every trauma thus
includes not only a traumatic story but a negative storyelement, an anti-story. I argue that the
Eichmann trial is an unprecedented legal event that articulates at once a monumental legal story and a
collective, monumental anti-story, the unanticipated story of the impossibility of telling.
On trauma theory as incapacity for narration, see, e.g., Van der Kolk & Van der Hart, supra note 43;
CARUTH, supra note 43. For general discussions of the relation between law and narrative, see, e.g.,
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987);
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller
& Kendall Thomas eds., 1995); LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter
Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE: A READER IN
STORYTELLING AND THE LAW (David Ray Papke ed., 1991); NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW:
THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow, Michael Ryan & Austin Sarat eds., 1995); ROBIN
WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW (1993); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE
AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79
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is itself an integral part of the history and of the story of the Holocaust.
The function of the trial thus becomes precisely to articulate the
impossibility of telling through the legal process and to convert it into
legal meaning. 00
My conception of the trial is, then, fundamentally different from that of
Arendt. Logically speaking, it is, however, Arendt's text that has helped
me to read the trial differently from her. It is precisely Arendt's own
surprised insistence on "how difficult it was to tell the story"'' and her
own excessive utterance-her own haunted allusions to Benjamin and to
The Storyteller-that have contributed to shape my own perspective. All
along, I have been reading Arendt's text to understand what was unique
(peculiar) in the trial and to gain an insight into what was happening in the
courtroom through the magnifying lens of Arendt's sharp and critically
insightful eyes. In this last chapter, I have suggested that besides the
criticism there is also an unspoken element of grief in Arendt's text, that a
relation between grief and justice indirectly and unconsciously informs
Arendt's utterance, and that it is precisely this excessiveness of Arendt's
utterance over her statement that gives her book authority and gives her
text a literary depth, an existential density and a political and legal-
philosophical charisma that go beyond the conscious terms of her spoken
argument.
I wish now to draw out this unspoken potential of Arendt's text and to
pursue it further in my own (quite different) way. In the remainder of my
argument, I will go farther than Arendt does in drawing on the haunting
relevance of Benjamin to Eichmann in Jerusalem and more generally, in
using Benjamin's reflection to highlight important aspects of the trial.
Although I will, from this point on, use Benjamin to read the trial
differently from Arendt (to argue with and argue beyond Arendt), my
different understanding and my different proposition, to the extent that
CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); James R. Elkins, On the Emergence of Narrative
Jurisprudence: the Humanistic Perspective Finds A New Path, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 123 (1985); James
R. Elkins, The Quest for Meaning: Narrative Accounts of Legal Education, J. LEGAL EDUC. 577
(1988); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993); Felman, supra note 41; Mar Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Austin
Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996);
Richard Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47
STAN. L. REV. 39 (1994).
100. Because the unanticipated force of the event of the impossibility of telling caught everyone
off guard and must have been surprising even to the trial's architects and to its legal actors, Arendt
treats it as a symptom of their oversight and of their failure. I see it as a proof of the success of their
conception beyond their grasp.
In the same way that K-Zetnik's fainting could not be foreseen and was not planned, the legal
narrative of the impossibility of telling could not be planned. It had to happen. It was the human and
the legal meaning of what happened. But no one could articulate this meaning at the time. It was the
unanticipated essence of the event, not part of the trial's stated ideology. It is only now in retrospect
that this significance comes into view and can be recognized and formulated.
101. ARENDT, supra note 10, at 229.
2001]
35
Felman: A Ghost in the House of Justice
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2001
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
they rely in turn on Benjamin's authority and on his haunting presence,
will also paradoxically be speaking with Arendt's text and from her
storyteller's silence: from the unconscious pathos of her own excessive
and yet silenced, muted, self-erased and self-transcendent utterance.
Ix
The Dramatic
In the wake of Benjamin, I argue therefore that the testimonial muteness
underlying (and exceeding) Arendt's legal story reenacts, ironically
enough, the literary muteness of K-Zetnik's story, and that K-Zetnik's
legal muteness-his inability to tell a story in the trial-is part of the
impossibility of telling at the trial's heart. Indeed, K-Zetnik's discourse
prior to his fainting strives to thematize precisely the impossibility of
telling, both in its use of the figure of "the other planet,"1"2 testifying to
the utter foreignness of Auschwitz and trying to convey the astronomic
scale of distance separating its ungraspability and unnarratability from the
narration in the courtroom in Jerusalem, and in its effort to narrate the
scene of the extermination as a repeated scene of parting and of silence, a
primal scene of silence whose sole meaning wordlessly resides in the
exchange of looks between the living and the dying: between the not-yet-
dead and the not-yet-surviving who remain behind for no other purpose
than to tell and to retell the story that cannot be told.
But K-Zetnik's testimony does not simply tell about the impossibility of
telling: it dramatizes it-enacts it-through its own lapse into coma and its
own collapse into a silence. "It was the most dramatic moment of the
trial," writes Tom Segev, "one of the most dramatic moments in the
country's history."'0 3
For Arendt as a critical legal observer and as a conscious representative
of the traditional conception of the law, however," the dramatic as such
is by definition immaterial and extraneous to the trial. Arendt's view
follows the classical axioms of jurisprudential thought. The process of the
law, says Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in one of the most authoritative
statements of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence in the twentieth century, "is one,
from a lawyer's statement of the case, eliminating as it does all the
dramatic elements ... and retaining only the facts of legal import, up to
the final analyses and abstract universals of theoretic jurisprudence."'0 5
102. Id. at 223-24.
103. SEGEV, supra note 14, at 4 (emphasis added).
104. 1 now return from the "subtext" of Eichmann in Jerusalem to Arendt's conscious and explicit
text: her conscious critical report as a legal historian of the trial.
105. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, Address delivered at the dedication of the new
hall of the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897) reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991
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This precisely is what Arendt tries to do, in discarding the dramatic and in
theorizing in her legal proposition about the Eichmann trial the "abstract
universal" of a new crime and of a new criminal without mens rea-
without motive. "The banality of evil" is, in fact, strictly a "theoretical
jurisprudential" concept: an antiseptic legal concept that is formed by the
strict reduction of the drama that has given rise to its conceptual necessity.
"If a man goes into law," says Holmes, "it pays to be a master of it, and to
be a master of it means to look straight through all the dramatic
incidents."' 06
Arendt therefore unambiguously discards the dramatic in the trial and
denies it legal meaning. I would argue here, in contrast, that the dramatic
can be legally significant. I submit that in the Eichmann trial (as the
passing comment of the judges has in fact conceded) the dramatic was
indeed endowed with legal meaning, meaning that the classical
jurisprudential, legalistic view was programmed to miss and that Arendt
consequently overlooked.
"As Hannah Arendt and others have pointed out," writes Susan Sontag:
[T]he juridical basis of the Eichmann trial, the relevance of all
the evidence presented and the legitimacy of certain procedures are
open to question on strictly legal grounds.
But the truth is that the Eichmann trial did not, and could not,
have conformed to legal standards only .... The function of the trial
was rather that of the tragic drama: above and beyond judgement and
punishment, catharsis.
[T[he problem with the Eichmann trial was not its deficient
legality, but the contradiction between its juridical form and its
dramatic function.107
Arendt herself acknowledged in the epilogue of Eichmann in Jerusalem
that, as the saying goes, "justice must not only be done but must be seen to
be done."1°8 The legal function of the court, in other words, is in its very
moral essence, a dramatic function: not only that of "doing justice," but
(1997).
106. Id. at 1006. "When we study law," Holmes asserts, "we are not studying a mystery." Id. at
991. Eichmann's banality, Arendt insists, and the banality of Nazism as a whole, is not a mystery. Its
essence is its shallowness, its hollow lack of depth. And this, says Arendt, is why "it is in the nature
of this case that we have no tools to hand except legal ones, with which we have to pass sentence on
something that cannot even be adequately represented either in legal terms or in political terms."
Letter from Arendt to Jaspers (Dec. 23, 1960), in CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 20, at 417. The tool is
purposely, revealingly reductive: "When we study law we are not studying a mystery."
107. Sontag, supra note 63, at 118-19 (emphasis added).
108. ARENDT, supra note 10, at 277.
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that of "making justice seen" in a larger moral and historically unique
sense. 0 9 It was through the perspective of this larger cultural and historic
visibility the trial gave dramatically, historically to justice that the
Eichmann trial was (I would propose)jurisprudentially dramatic.
In a different context, Walter Benjamin in turn defines the dramatic:
The mystery is, on the dramatic level, that moment in which it juts
out of the domain of language proper to it into a higher one
unattainable for it. Therefore, this moment cannot be expressed in
words but is expressible solely in representation: it is the "dramatic"
in the strictest sense.110
Law in principle rules out what cannot be disclosed in words. In contrast,
the dramatic, Benjamin says, is a beyond of words. It is a physical gesture
by which language points to a meaning it cannot articulate.
Such is K-Zetnik's fall outside the witness stand. It makes a corpse out
of the living witness who has sworn to remain anonymous and
undifferentiated from the dead.
I argue that the witness's body has become within the trial what Pierre
Nora would call "a site of memory.""' In opposition to the trial's effort to
create a conscious, totalizing memory and a totalizing historical
consciousness, the site of memory is an unintegratable, residual
unconscious site that cannot be translated into legal consciousness and
into legal idiom. This site materializes in the courtroom memory of death
both as a physical reality and as a limit of consciousness in history.
On this legal site, the witness testifies through his unconscious body.
Suddenly, the testimony is invaded by the body. The speaking body has
become a dying body. The dying body testifies dramatically and
wordlessly beyond the cognitive and the discursive limits of the witness's
speech.
The body's testimony thus creates a new dimension in the trial, a
physical legal dimension that dramatically expands what can be grasped as
legal meaning. I argue that this new dimension in its turn transforms and
dramatically reshapes not just the legal process of the Eichmann trial, but
the conception and the very frameworks of perception of the law as such.
109. In this sense, the Eichmann trial did fulfill its function, even in Arendt's critical eyes. "Those
who are convinced that justice, and nothing else, is the end of law will be inclined to condone the
kidnapping act, though not because of precedents." Id. at 264-65.
This last of the Successor trials will no more, and perhaps even less than its predecessors, serve
as a valid precedent for future trials of such crimes. This might be of little import in view of the
fact that its main purpose-to prosecute and to defend, to judge and to punish Adolph
Eichmann-was achieved.
Id. at 272-73.
110. 1 WALTER BENJAMIN, Goethe's Elective Affinities, in SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 91,
at 297, 355; (emphasis added).
111. Pierre Nora, Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mdmoire, in 26 REPRESENTATIONS
7 (Mark Roudebush trans., 1989).
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The Caesura of the Trial: The Expressionless
How is it that the body can unconsciously transform the parameters of
law as such? The witness's fainting-the body's dramatic collapse in the
midst of the witness's verbal testimony-could strikingly exemplify
within the structure of the trial what Walter Benjamin calls "the
expressionless":
The life undulating in it [Benjamin writes, and I would specify: the
life undulating in the trial] must appear petrified and as if spellbound
in a single moment.... What... spellbinds the movement and
interrupts the harmony is the expressionless. ... Just as interruption
by the commanding word is able to bring the truth out of the
evasions ... precisely at the point where it interrupts, the
expressionless compels the trembling harmony to stop .... For it
shatters whatever still survives of the legacy of chaos... the false,
errant totality, the absolute totality. Only the expressionless
completes the work [completes the trial], by shattering it into a thing
of shards, into a fragment of the true world, into the torso of a
symbol.'
1 2
To borrow Benjamin's inspired terms to describe the trial, I would argue
that K-Zetnik's fainting and his petrified body stand for the
"expressionless"--das Ausdruckslose-that suddenly irrupts into the
language of the law and interrupts the trial. In Benjamin's terms, I would
argue that K-Zetnik's collapse can be defined as "the caesura" of the
trial" 3 : a moment of petrification that interrupts and ruptures the
articulations of the law, and yet that grounds them by shattering their false
totality into "a fragment of the true world"; a sudden "counter-rhythmic
rupture" in which (as Benjamin has put it) "every expression
simultaneously comes to a standstill, in order to give free reign to an
expressionless power." '" 4
The fainting that cuts through the witness's speech and petrifies his
body interrupts the legal process and creates a moment that is legally
traumatic not just for the witness, but chiefly for the court and for the
audience of the trial. I argue in effect that, in the rupture of the witness's
lapse into a coma, it is the law itself that for a moment loses
consciousness. But it is through this breakdown of the legal framework
that history emerges in the courtroom and, in the legal body of the witness,
exhibits its own inadvertently dramatic (non-discursive) rules of evidence.
112. BENJAMIN, supra note 110, at 340.
113. Benjamin (using Holderlin's terms) speaks of "the caesura of the work." Id. at 354, 340-41.
114. "Thereby, in the rhythmic sequence of the representations... there becomes necessary what
in poetic meter is called the caesura .... the counter-rhythmic rupture... that caesura in which, along
with harmony, every expression simultaneously comes to a standstill, in order to give free reign to an
expressionless power .... "Id. at 340-41.
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It is precisely through this breach of consciousness of law that history
unwittingly and mutely yet quite resonantly, memorably speaks. 115
And it is for these moments in which history as injury dramatically,
traumatically has spoken-these moments that combined the legal, the
dramatic, and the legally traumatic, yet whose eloquence and legal
meaning could not be translated into legal idiom-that the Eichmann trial
is remembered. It is precisely through these moments that the Eichmann
trial has impressed itself on memory, as a remarkable legal event in which
the law itself was shattered into a new level of perception and into a new
historical and legal consciousness.
PART FOUR: CONCLUSION
This Essay has dealt with a legal moment that took the legal institution
by surprise and stupefied at once the judges and the audience of the trial.
In their written opinion, the judges marked the unique evidentiary position
of this moment in the trial. They thought it was significant that it was a
literary writer who collapsed, and that it was an artist's testimony that the
trial exploded. Indeed, law has exploded here the literary framework. In
turn, the conflation of the writer's literary testimony with the law has
brought about a parallel explosion of the legal framework. Both the legal
and the literary frameworks came apart as a result of their encounter in the
trial. I argue that this breakdown-this caesura-was legally significant
although (and because) it was legally traumatic.
This moment in which the human witness, flabbergasting both the
audience and the judges, plunges into the abyss between the different
planets and falls as though he were himself a corpse, is internal to the trial.
I argue that it is a moment inside law, although its power comes from its
interruption of the law, its interruption of discourse by what Walter
Benjamin calls "the expressionless." The expressionless, I argue, grounds
both the legal meaning of the trial and its inadvertent literary and dramatic
power.
For the purpose of transmission of the Holocaust, literature and art do
not suffice. And yet, a trial is equally insufficient. I believe that only the
encounter between law and art can adequately testify to the abyssal
meaning of the trauma.
It is remarkable that such an encounter between trauma, law, and art
115. It is as though, summoned to court, history acquired power of speech in amplifying and in
making audible K-Zetnik's own repeated yet repeatedly mute cry. He writes:
That mute cry was again trying to break loose, as it had every time death confronted me at
Auschwitz; and, as always when I looked death in the eye, so now too the mute scream got no
further than my clenched teeth that closed upon it and locked it inside me. Indeed that was the
essence of that cry: it was never realized, never exposed to the outside air. It remained a
strangled flame inside me.
KA-TZETNIK, supra note 12, at 1-2 (translation modified by author according to Hebrew original,
supra note 12, at 18).
[Vol. 13:241
40
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol13/iss1/9
2001] Felman
happens inside a trial. Inside the trial, in the drama of the missed
encounter between K-Zetnik and the legal actors (judge and prosecutor),
there is a unique confrontation between literature and law as two
vocabularies of remembrance. The clash between these two dimensions
and these two vocabularies brings about a breakdown of the legal
framework through the physical collapse of the witness. Yet, through this
inadvertent breakdown of the legal framework, history uncannily and
powerfully speaks. "Everything," said Benjamin, "about history that, from
the very beginning, has been untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful, is
expressed in a face,116 or rather in a death's head. '""7
This death's head emerges in the trial as history is uncannily transmitted
through K-Zetnik's fainting and through his endlessly reverberating
courtroom silence.
In borrowing the words of Lanzmann, I will therefore argue that what
Arendt calls the failures118 of the trial were necessary failures.19 I argue
that the Eichmann trial dramatically articulated legal meaning that no legal
categories could apprehend precisely through its failures. I further argue
that it is in general a feature of pathbreaking trials to speak through the
explosion of the legal framework, to legally say something (or show
something) that is not containable precisely by the concepts and the logic
of the legal. Moments of rupture of the legal framework can be-as they
116. Compare the strikingly resonant statements of the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas:
The relation to the face is all at once the relation to the absolutely weak-what is absolutely
exposed, what is naked and what is deprived ... and at the same time.., the face is also the
"Thou shall not kill"... It is the fact that I cannot let the other die alone, it is as though there
were [from the face] an appeal to me .... For me, he is above all the one for which I am
responsible. ... It is always from the face, from my responsibility for the other, that justice
emerges.
EMMANUEL LEVINAS, Philosophie, Justice, Amour, in ENTRE NOuS: ESSAI SUR LE PENSER .k L'AUTRE
114-15 (1991) (author's translation) (emphasis added).
117. WALTER BENJAMIN, THE ORIGIN OF GERMAN TRAGIC DRAMA 166 (1985) (1966).
118.
And indeed, before we come to any conclusion about the success or failure of the Jerusalem
court, we must stress the judges' firm belief that they had no right to become legislators, that
they had to conduct their business within the limits of Israeli law, on the one hand, and of
accepted legal opinion, on the other. It must be admitted furthermore that their failures were
neither in kind nor in degree greater than the failures of the Nuremberg Trials or the Successor
Trials in other European countries. On the contrary, part of the failure of the Jerusalem court
was due to its all too eager adherence to the Nuremberg precedent ....
ARENDT, supra note 10, at 274 (emphasis added).
119. Asked what was his concept of the Holocaust, Lanzmann answered:
I had no concept. I had obsessions, which is different .... The obsession of the cold .... The
obsession of the first time .... The obsession of the last moments, the waiting, the fear. Shoah
is a film full of fear .... You cannot do such a film theoretically. Every theoretical attempt was
a failure, but these failures were necessary.... You build such a film in your head, in your
heart, in your belly, in your guts, everywhere.
Interview with Claude Lanzmann at Yale University, New Haven, Conn. (May 5, 1986) (film and
transcript available at Fortunoff Video-Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale) (transcription at
22-23) (emphasis added).
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were, I argue, in the Eichmann trial-moments of legal and conceptual
breakthrough. Moments of institutional collapse and of "caesura" of the
legal discourse-such as during K-Zetnik's fainting-can be moments in
which both art and history unwittingly speak in and through the legal tool.
I offer this as food for thought: Great trials are perhaps specifically
those trials whose very failures have their own necessity and their own
literary, cultural, and jurisprudential speaking power.
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